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I. INTRODUCTION
What role does tort law have to play in drug research and develop-
ment? Does the threat of liability create valuable incentives (and make
up for perceived failings in regulatory oversight), or, instead, does it un-
duly interfere with innovation and patient access? These and related
questions have inspired an active and largely inconclusive debate among
commentators, while courts and legislators have made occasional forays
into the area by constricting the scope of potential tort liability in par-
ticular circumstances.' The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability, which the American Law Institute (ALI) published one decade
ago, includes special provisions governing prescription drug cases,2 and
* Professor of Law, University of Florida; author of LAW, MEDICINE, AND MEDICAL
TECHNOLOGY: CASES AND MATERIALS (Foundation Press, 2d ed. 2007).
1. See Lars Noah, Rewarding Regulatory Compliance: The Pursuit of Symmetry in
Products Liability, 88 GEO. L.J. 2147, 2152-54 nn.24-28, 2157 & n.41 (2000); Lars Noah,
Triage in the Nation's Medicine Cabinet: The Puzzling Scarcity of Vaccines and Other Drugs,
54 S.C. L. REV. 741, 743-44, 759-64 (2003).
2. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 (1998) [hereinafter
PRODUCTS RESTATEMENT]. For a comprehensive review of these issues and a wide-ranging
critique of the earlier commentary, see Lars Noah, This Is Your Products Liability Restatement
on Drugs, 74 BROOK. L. REv. (forthcoming 2009). I borrow from and expand upon a few
sections of that symposium contribution in this Article.
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the pitched battle over using implied preemption as a defense,3 repre-
sents only the latest manifestation of these sharp disagreements.
This Article focuses on one emerging aspect of tort litigation against
pharmaceutical manufacturers that, if it gained traction, portends a
dramatic (and potentially counterproductive) expansion in the prescrip-
tion drug industry's exposure to liability. The traditional theories of
products liability-mismanufacture, defective design, and inadequate
warnings-no longer exhaust the potential obligations of sellers. In addi-
tion to increasingly popular claims of misrepresentation and negligent
marketing, which seem more like extensions of the three defect catego-
ries than entirely novel theories, a growing chorus of commentators
would impose on pharmaceutical manufacturers a broader duty to test
and educate (aspects of what they call an obligation of "product steward-
ship").4 Frustrated by the inherent limitations of preapproval clinical
trials,5 the failure of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to demand
rigorous postapproval testing,6 and the minimal information communi-
3. See Wyeth, Inc. v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (rejecting an implied preemption
defense to a claim that the manufacturer of a prescription drug failed to supply an adequate
warning, but failing to foreclose altogether the possibility that such a tort claim might conflict
with a more clearly expressed FDA labeling requirement); Buckman v. Plaintiffs' Legal
Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347-53 (2001) (holding that fraud-on-the-FDA claim involving medi-
cal device review was impliedly preempted); R.F. v. Abbott Labs., 745 A.2d 1174, 1187-88,
1192-94 (N.J. 2000) (finding implied preemption of tort claims where the FDA had approved
an AIDS screening test for use by blood banks); cf Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 467
F.3d 85, 93-98 (2d Cir. 2006) (rejecting the argument that fraud exception in Michigan statute
that had codified a compliance defense was preempted), aff'd mem., 128 S. Ct. 1168 (2008)
(by an equally divided court).
4. See George W. Conk, Punctuated Equilibrium: Why § 402A Flourished and the
Products Liability Restatement Languished, 26 REV. LITIG. 799, 856-62, 878-80 (2007); see
also Margaret A. Berger & Aaron D. Twerski, Uncertainty and Informed Choice: Unmasking
Daubert, 104 MICH. L. REV. 257 (2005). I summarize and critique these proposals below in
Part III.A & B respectively.
5. See New Drug and Antibiotic Regulations, 50 Fed. Reg. 7452, 7471 (Feb. 22, 1985)
(codified in scattered sections of 21 C.ER.) ("The much larger patient population and longer
period of use associated with the marketing of a drug provides, for the first time, the opportu-
nity to collect information on rare, latent, and long-term effects, some of which may be
serious."); David A. Kessler, Introducing MEDWatch: A New Approach to Reporting Medica-
tion and Device Adverse Effects and Product Problems, 269 JAMA 2765 (1993); Robert J.
Temple & Martin H. Himmel, Editorial, Safety of Newly Approved Drugs: Implications for
Prescribing, 287 JAMA 2273 (2002); see also Marc Kaufman, FDA Is Criticized over Drugs'
Safety Problems, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 2006, at A5 (summarizing a new GAO report, which
"concluded that the agency's entire system for reviewing the safety of drugs already on the
market is too limited and broadly flawed").
6. See Bruce M. Psaty & Curt D. Furberg, Editorial, Rosiglitazone and Cardiovascu-
lar Risk, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2522, 2523-24 (2007). Until recently, the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) made no mention of postmarket study requirements. See
Robert L. Fleshner, Post-Marketing Surveillance of Prescription Drugs: Do We Need to
Amend the FDCA?, 18 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 327, 329-31 (1981). In 1997, Congress authorized
the imposition of such requirements, though only for drugs eligible for "fast track" review. See
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cated directly to patients,7 these commentators have urged judges to draw
on the common law tradition in order to remedy these and other alleged
failings of the regulatory system.
II. DUTIES TO KEEP TESTING
A. Knowability Thresholds
Whether resolving a design or informational defect claim, courts
may struggle to determine precisely when a seller should have known
that its product presented a risk of injury.8 Manufacturers have no duty to
warn of unknowable risks associated with drugs.9 Some courts have
Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, §§ 112, 130,
111 Stat. 2296, 2309-10, 2331-32 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 356(b), 356b(a)
(2000)). One decade later, it broadened the agency's authority in this area. See Food and Drug
Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, tit. IX, 121 Stat. 823, 922
[hereinafter FDAAA]. Long before it received express authority to demand Phase IV trials, the
agency often demanded as a condition of product approval that applicants undertake postap-
proval research, see Charles Steenburg, The Food and Drug Administration's Use of
Postmarketing (Phase IV) Study Requirements: Exception to the Rule?, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
295, 325-27 (2006), though it has done a poor job of holding pharmaceutical manufacturers to
these promises, see Jennifer Corbett Dooren, Review Finds Gap in Required Study of Ap-
proved Drugs, WALL ST. J., June 1, 2005, at D4; 65% of Promised Drug Studies Pending,
WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2006, at A4.
7. See Catherine A. Paytash, Note, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine and Patient
Package Inserts: A Balanced Approach to Preventing Drug-Related Injuries, 51 STAN. L. REV.
1343, 1367-71 (1999) (urging an administrative solution rather than expanding the duty to
warn); Francesca Lunzer Kritz, Not-So-Fine Print: Patient Drug Leaflets Omit Key Warnings,
Other Information, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2002, at F1 (describing problems in the implemen-
tation of a voluntary patient labeling program ordered by Congress); Sheryl Gay Stolberg,
Faulty Warning Labels Add to Risk in Prescription Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1999, at A27
("In a 1997 survey of 1,000 patients, the F.D.A. found that only one-third had received infor-
mation from their doctors about the dangerous side effects of drugs they were taking.").
8. Imagine that a drug company receives a single report from a physician of an unex-
pected adverse drug event (ADE) in a patient. If the suspected ADE turns out to be spurious,
subsequent patients will not suffer that injury or, if they do and attempt to file a lawsuit, pa-
tients will lose on causation at trial; if, however, the drug turns out to have caused the injury,
plaintiffs often will have stronger evidence of causation by the time of trial even though the far
less certain ADE would have served as the trigger for the duty to warn at the earlier time of
sale. One would expect courts to require greater substantiation of risks before allowing a
design defect (as opposed to a failure-to-warn) claim to proceed. Technologically sophisti-
cated products subject to lengthy premarket review by administrative agencies pose tricky
"state-of-the-art" questions. If risk information comes to light late in the agency's review,
sellers generally still can make labeling modifications before sale, but designs become fixed
earlier in the R&D process.
9. See Griggs v. Combe, Inc., 456 So. 2d 790, 791-93 (Ala. 1984) (rejecting claims
because topical benzocaine had never before been associated with the development of
Stevens-Johnson Syndrome); Toner v. Lederle Labs., 732 P.2d 297, 306-07 (Idaho 1987)
("Comment k does not require sellers to be clairvoyant."); Moore v. Vanderloo, 386 N.W.2d
108, 116 (Iowa 1986); Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 782 (R.I. 1988)
(refusing to hold manufacturer of DES liable "for failure to warn of risks inherent in a drug
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found a breach of the duty to warn on the basis of extremely weak evi-
dence that a substance may have caused an injury,"0 while other courts
have demanded greater substantiation of a risk allegedly posed by a
product."
In one case, the California Supreme Court attempted to define the
"knowability" threshold. The majority explained that a pharmaceutical
company would have a duty to warn only of "reasonably scientifically
knowable risks." 2 Although it equivocated in further defining this test,
the court in Carlin suggested that the inquiry would focus on how a rea-
sonable "scientist conducting state-of-the-art research" would interpret a
body of data. 3 The standard apparently does not, however, ask how such
[because] it neither knew nor could have known by the application of scientific knowledge
available at the time of distribution that the drug could produce the undesirable effects suf-
fered by plaintiff"); see also PRODUCTS RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 6 cmt. g; Kathleen H.
Wilson, Note, The Liability of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers for Unforeseen Adverse Drug
Reactions, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 735, 745-50 (1980). A pair of jurisdictions impute knowl-
edge to pharmaceutical manufacturers, thereby shifting the burden of proof on this issue to the
defendant. See Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1199-200 (Alaska 1992); Feldman v.
Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 387-88 (N.J. 1984).
10. See, e.g., Hermes v. Pfizer, Inc., 848 F2d 66, 68 (5th Cir. 1988) (adverse event
reports); Wells v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 788 F.2d 741, 745-46 (11 th Cir. 1986) (manufacturer of
spermicide had a duty to warn of possible teratogenicity notwithstanding the FDA's conclu-
sion that these drugs did not cause birth defects). For instance, courts have held that a
reasonable jury could have found a failure to warn of a risk not revealed during clinical trials
because of knowledge that a chemically similar product created such a risk. See Thorn v. Bris-
tol-Myers Squibb Co., 353 F.3d 848, 854-55 (10th Cir. 2003); Wagner v. Roche Labs., 671
N.E.2d 252, 256-58 (Ohio 1996); see also Mulligan v. Lederle Labs., 786 F.2d 859, 864-65
(8th Cir. 1986) (sustaining a verdict for the plaintiff where the manufacturer previously had
received reports of similar but not identical adverse reactions); Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons,
682 P.2d 832, 836 (Utah 1984) (reports that progesterone caused birth defects should have
alerted manufacturer of progesterone-derivative of teratogenic potential).
11. See, e.g., Grenier v. Med. Eng'g Corp., 243 F3d 200, 205 (5th Cir. 2001) (rejecting
the plaintiff's claim because she "presented no evidence about the cause, frequency, severity,
or consequences of 'gel bleed' with regard to the [silicone breast] implants at issue in this
case"); Smith v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 770 F. Supp. 1561, 1582 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (rejecting
failure-to-warn claim because there was no "reasonably reliable" evidence that spermicide
caused birth defects); Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 677 P.2d 1147, 1153 (Cal. 1984) ("Knowl-
edge of a potential side effect which is based on a single isolated report of a possible link
between a prescription drug and an injury may not require a warning."); Young v. Key Pharm.,
Inc., 922 P.2d 59, 62, 65-69 (Wash. 1996) (affirming jury verdict in part based on the defen-
dant's argument that "the state of knowledge about the relationship between fevers or viral
illnesses and theophylline [a bronchodilator with a narrow therapeutic margin] was not yet
clinically reliable and that it would have been irresponsible for the drug company to warn of
risks that were not yet proven to be legitimate risks").
12. Carlin v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 1347, 1349 (Cal. 1996) ("[W]e have expressly
and repeatedly applied a strict liability standard to manufacturers of prescription drugs for
failure to warn of known or reasonably scientifically knowable risks.").
13. See id. at 1353 ("[W]hen a plaintiff's claim is based on an allegation that a particu-
lar risk was 'reasonably scientifically knowable,' an inquiry may arise as to what a reasonable
scientist operating in good faith should have known under the circumstances of the evi-
dence.").
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a scientist would interpret the data against the totality of other research
casting light on the particular question.
4
The Carlin majority conceded that, "if state-of-the-art scientific data
concerning the alleged risk was [sic] fully disclosed to the FDA and it
determined, after review, that the pharmaceutical manufacturer was not
permitted to warn," then "the FDA's conclusion that there was, in effect,
no 'known risk' is controlling."'5 Even though the decision to defer to the
agency's determination makes perfect sense,' 6 it seems odd to anoint the
FDA as the arbiter of what is "known." A partial dissent in the case em-
phasized that the majority's standard "fails to recognize, much less deal
with, the complexity of scientific evaluations,"' 7 and it recommended
instead a duty to warn "only of those risks supported by credible scien-
tific evidence or that upon reasonable inquiry would be supported by
credible scientific evidence."' 8
B. Seeking out Risk Information
California's reasonable biomedical researcher standard fails to ex-
plain whether sellers would have any obligation to generate-as opposed
to become aware of already available-risk information. A few years
after the Carlin decision, an intermediate appellate state court wrote that
14. See id. at 1351 ("[A] reasonably prudent manufacturer might reasonably decide that
the risk of harm was such as not to require a warning as, for example, if the manufacturer's
own testing showed a result contrary to that of others in the scientific community. Such a
manufacturer might escape liability under negligence principles."); Howard A. Denemark,
Improving Litigation Against Drug Manufacturers for Failure to Warn Against Possible Side
Effects: Keeping Dubious Lawsuits from Driving Good Drugs Off the Market, 40 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 413,437-41 (1990) (criticizing such an approach).
15. Carlin, 920 P.2d at 1353.
16. See id. at 1365 n.5 (Kennard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Noah,
Rewarding Regulatory Compliance, supra note 1, at 2153-58, 2165. In contrast, most courts
treat compliance with FDA requirements as relevant but not dispositive. See, e.g., Wells v.
Ortho Pharm. Corp., 788 F.2d 741,746 (11 th Cir. 1986) ("An FDA determination that a warn-
ing is not necessary may be sufficient for federal regulatory purposes but still not be sufficient
for state tort law purposes."); Wooderson v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 681 P.2d 1038, 1057 (Kan.
1984) (ignoring FDA letter to a manufacturer rejecting addition of requested warning).
17. Carlin, 920 P.2d at 1360 (Kennard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("[Tihe quality of scientific evidence 'may range from extremely vague to highly certain.'...
Scientific studies suggesting associations between products and injuries may themselves be
subjected to legitimate question as to the validity of their methods and the soundness of their
conclusions.").
18. Id. at 1365 ("Evidence of a risk would be scientifically credible if the data upon
which it is based, the methodology employed, and its conclusions identifying the existence of
a risk comply with generally accepted scientific methodology and analysis."). In short, Justice
Kennard sought to overlay rules for the admissibility of expert testimony on the question of
when a risk becomes knowable. See id. at 1364 ("In determining the admissibility of new
scientific techniques, this court has held that evidence of a technique is admissible only if it
has gained acceptance in the particular scientific field to which it belongs?').
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the "imposition of liability for breach of an independent duty to conduct
long-term testing, where the causal link to the known harm to plaintiff is
the unknown outcome of testing that was not done, would be beyond the
pale of any California tort doctrine we can identify."' 9
Drug-drug interactions provide an illustration of the potential diffi-
culties in defining a broader duty to test. Obviously, if a manufacturer
discovers a dangerous interaction during clinical trials or post-market
surveillance, then it would have a duty to communicate information
about the risk.20 What if, however, a patient experiences a previously un-
known acute drug interaction and argues that the manufacturer should
have tested for it?2' A strict liability standard that focused on the know-
ability of this risk seemingly would ask only whether a manufacturer
could have checked for the interaction, while a negligence standard
would recognize the impracticality of testing for every conceivable drug-
drug interaction.22
19. Valentine v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 252, 265 (Ct. App. 1999)
(emphasis omitted); see also id. (explaining instead that "Baxter was charged with an ongoing
duty to warn of side effects 'known or knowable' in the scientific community" which the jury
concluded this manufacturer of silicone-gel breast implants had satisfied); Castrignano v. E.R.
Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 782-83 (R.I. 1988) ("In their capacity as experts they
must carefully monitor the new developments and research that pertain to the drugs that they
manufacture").
29. See, e.g., Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 976 F.2d 77, 81-82 (1st Cir. 1992) (allowing
failure-to-warn claim against manufacturer of phenobarbital to proceed where drug allegedly
interacted with amoxicillin and caused toxic epidermal necrolysis); Ferrara v. Berlex Lab.,
Inc., 732 F. Supp. 552, 553-55 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (rejecting failure-to-warn claim against manu-
facturer of MAO inhibitor because it had warned physicians of dangerous interactions with
over forty substances, including a decongestant that the plaintiff's physician had prescribed).
21. See Bryant v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 585 S.E.2d 723, 728-30 (Ga. Ct. App.
2003) (allowing such a claim to proceed based on testimony from the plaintiffs' expert wit-
nesses); see also Robert J. Mayer, Editorial, Targeted Therapy for Advanced Colorectal
Cancer-More Is Not Always Better, 360 NEw ENG. J. MED. 623 (2009) (describing entirely
unexpected efficacy problems encountered when using a pair of approved drugs in combina-
tion); D.I. Quinn & R.O. Day, Drug Interactions of Clinical Importance, 12 DRUG SAFETY
393 (1995) (cataloging known interactions); Jennifer Corbett Dooren, Safety of Plavix Under
Review, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2009, at D3; Robert Langreth, Recall of a Popular Roche Drug
Raises Questions on Testing, Approval Process, WALL ST. J., June 10, 1998, at B 16 (discuss-
ing the discovery of several additional serious interactions shortly after approval of Posicor
that led to its withdrawal).
22. See Richard McCormick, Pharmaceutical Manufacturer's Duty to Warn of Adverse
Drug Interactions, 66 DEF. COuNS. J. 59, 67 (1999) (arguing that application of a strict liabil-
ity standard in this context would threaten to impose limitless liability); id. at 68 ("If every
concurrent use is foreseeable, then manufacturers would be obligated to test for these interac-
tions, increasing the time beneficial drugs would take to go to market and pushing prices
beyond the reach of most consumers."); see also id. at 65 ("[Flew cases directly consider the
manufacturer's failure to warn of an interaction that it should have discovered prior to market-
ing."); Ceci Connolly, Price Tagfor a New Drug, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2001, atAl0 (reporting
estimates that place the average investment for an approved new drug at more than $800 mil-
lion, and adding that the figure had more than tripled in the space of a decade, largely because
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According to the Products Liability Restatement, pharmaceutical
"manufacturers have the responsibility to perform reasonable testing
prior to marketing a product and to discover risks and risk-avoidance
measures that such testing would reveal. '"23 In a failure-to-warn case in-
volving an antibiotic's side effect discovered only after FDA approval,
the New Jersey Supreme Court explained that "a manufacturer is held to
the standard of an expert in the field," which means that it "must keep
reasonably abreast of scientific knowledge and discoveries" and "may
also be required to make tests to determine the propensities and dangers
of [its] product., 24 Although a few courts resolving products liability
claims against sellers of medical technologies have made a similar
point,25 the case law offers essentially no guidance about the contours of
such a duty to test.26 A few commentators have proposed, instead, shift-
ing the burden of proof on matters of general causation as a way of
effectuating a duty to test.27 Separately, recognition of so-called "medical
of demands for larger and more complex clinical trials). FDA guidelines governing this aspect
of clinical trials might provide a standard of what a reasonable company would do.
23. PRODUCTS RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 6 cmt. g; see also id. § 2 cmt. m ("The
harms that result from unforeseeable risks-for example, in the human body's reaction to a
new drug, medical device, or chemical-are not a basis of liability. Of course, a seller ... is
charged with knowledge of what reasonable testing would reveal."); id. § 10 cmt. c ("With
regard to ... prescription drugs and devices, courts traditionally impose a continuing duty of
reasonable care to test and monitor after sale to discover product-related risks."); cf id. § 10
cmt. c, reporters' note (discussing post-sale constructive knowledge only in relation to the
available literature-namely, "a continuous duty to keep abreast of scientific developments").
Obviously, this question could arise as well with any number of other types of products.
24. Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 386-87 (N.J. 1984); see also Lindsay v.
Ortho Pharm. Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The duty is a continuous one, requiring
the manufacturer to keep abreast of the current state of knowledge of its products as gained
through research, adverse reaction reports, scientific literature, and other available methods.");
Wooderson v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 681 P.2d 1038, 1049-50, 1057 (Kan. 1984) (same).
25. See, e.g., Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 707 F. Supp. 1517, 1528-29 (D. Minn.
1989) ("[T]he duty to test is a subpart... of the duty to wam'"); Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
436 N.E.2d 182, 188-90 (N.Y. 1982) (allowing plaintiff's claim that DES manufacturer could
have discovered reproductive toxicity if it had undertaken rodent testing); Collins v. Eli Lilly
Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 52 (Wis. 1984) (same, focusing on postapproval period).
26. See Daniel R. Cahoy, Medical Product Information Incentives and the Transpar-
ency Paradox, 82 IND. L.J. 623, 640-41 & nn.78-81 (2006) (discussing the still limited
recognition of a common law duty to test); see also id. at 645 ("[A] manufacturer may rea-
sonably conclude that the [liability] risks of generating potentially harmful intormation
outweigh the benefits."); Young K. Lee, Note, Beyond Gatekeeping: Class Certification, Judi-
cial Oversight, and the Promotion of Scientific Research in "Immature" Pharmaceutical
Torts, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1905, 1907 (2005) ("[I]t seems unlikely that manufacturers would,
of their own volition, undertake research designed to determine the potential harm caused by
an approved drug, thereby opening themselves up to greater liability."); id. at 1928-35 (urging
federal courts to certify class action lawsuits in such cases, and implausibly proposing that
they then appoint panels of neutral experts to design and seek NIH funding of epidemiological
studies in order to settle unresolved questions of general causation).
27. See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a
New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2117, 2152 (1997); see also Lars
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monitoring" claims would amount to court orders that pharmaceutical
(and other) manufacturers must engage in more careful surveillance once
suspicions of a problem come to light."
III. DUTIES TO HELP EDUCATING
In the last few years, and in conjunction with concerns that pharma-
ceutical manufacturers have failed to satisfy their (regulatory)
obligations to test, a few commentators have proposed dramatic expan-
sions in the (tort) duty to test and warn of risks associated with
prescription drugs. Both sets of proposals suffer from serious flaws, and
they pay special attention to "lifestyle" drugs without ever explaining
what sets these medications apart from their more valuable therapeutic
brethren.
A. "Product Stewardship" Proposals
In a recent article, George Conk urged the recognition of an ex-
panded obligation to test and warn.29 "This patient-centered approach
emphasizes the ongoing experimental quality of medical products, and a
corresponding duty of product stewardship-a duty of ongoing study
and product development, a duty of systematic manufacturer surveil-
lance of the actual use of their products after obtaining regulatory
approval to market the product."30 I concur wholeheartedly with his point
Noah, Civil Jury Nullification, 86 IowA L. REV. 1601, 1643 (2001) ("[S]ome have applauded
the failure by civil juries to abide by causation instructions as appropriately shifting the burden
of proof to industries producing toxic chemicals without adequate safety testing."); id. at 1649
("Jury tendencies to commingle weak evidence of causation with strong evidence of culpabil-
ity have not prompted the doctrinal reforms favored by those who applaud this type of
nullification.... On the contrary, ... courts have reacted by clamping down on the rules for
the admissibility of expert evidence ... "); cf Albert Lin, Deciphering the Chemical Soup:
Using Public Nuisance to Compel Chemical Testing (forthcoming 2009), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract= 1329143 (suggesting a different approach to this problem).
28. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Liability for Medical Monitoring and the Problem of
Limits, 88 VA. L. REV. 1975, 1978, 1984-88 (2002); see also Paz v. Brush Engineered Materi-
als, Inc., 949 So. 2d 1, 6-7 (Miss. 2007) (canvassing the division of authority in other
jurisdictions); Sinclair v. Merck & Co., 948 A.2d 587, 594-96 (N.J. 2008) (declining to rec-
ognize such claims in Vioxx cases); Victor E. Schwartz et al., Medical Monitoring: The Right
Way and the Wrong Way, 70 Mo. L. REV. 349 (2005) (criticizing those courts that have al-
lowed such claims).
29. See Conk, supra note 4, at 856-62, 877-80; id. at 805 (proposing "a common law
duty to act affirmatively throughout the product's life-cycle, to systematically study uses and
harms, to protect those who consume or are otherwise affected by their products").
30. Id. at 805-06; see also id. at 858-59 (elaborating on the point that experimentation
continues after FDA approval); id. at 881 (emphasizing "the importance of recognizing an
affirmative duty of product stewardship for producers of products that should essentially re-
main in development and subject to revision during their entire period of use by patients").
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about the inescapably experimental nature of pharmaceuticals,3 but I
find little merit in Conk's affiliated suggestions that drug manufacturers
should face liability for failing to continue actively studying their prod-
ucts after FDA approval. "Product stewardship" has a nice, though
amorphous, ring to it, which might entice courts to impose an expansive
and potentially limitless new tort duty.
Although he referred repeatedly to the need for more active postmar-
ket "surveillance" (which normally connotes the collection and analysis of
reported adverse events32), Conk appeared to call for more structured
postapproval research (i.e., "Phase IV" trials),33 but he never confronted
the difficulties that arise with designing and conducting such studies 4 He
Although Conk's previous work had focused on liberalizing the standard for design defect
claims, he made passing references to "product stewardship." See, e.g., George W. Conk, The
True Test: Alternative Safer Designs for Drugs and Medical Devices in a Patent-Constrained
Market, 49 UCLA L. REv. 737, 755 (2002). For my extended critique of his earlier work, see
Noah, supra note 2, at pts. II.B-C, especially pt. II.C.4-5.
31. See Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard
and Experimental Therapy, 28 Am. J.L. & MED. 361, 362 (2002) ("[AIII medical interventions
have an experimental quality to them."); id. at 363 ("[P]roduct approval does not define the
point at which an investigational intervention passes the threshold into standard therapy. In-
stead, the research phase continues after licensure, both in the sense that more safety data
accumulates and insofar as physicians may improvise when using a product in ways not origi-
nally contemplated."); id. at 394 ("One common misconception is that FDA approval of a
medical technology represents the point at which it crosses the line from experimental to stan-
dard therapy."); id. at 394-99 (elaborating); see also id. at 386-94 & nn.134, 141 (discussing
the indistinct line between treatment and research); id. at 400-08 (same). See generally Ber-
nadette Tansey, Hard Sell: How Marketing Drives the Pharmaceutical Industry; What FDA
Approval Means; Agency Weighs Benefits, Risks Before Drugs Get to Market, S.F. CHRON.,
Mar. 3, 2005, at C 1.
32. See Timothy Brewer & Graham A. Colditz, Postmarketing Surveillance and
Adverse Drug Reactions: Current Perspectives and Future Needs, 281 JAMA 824, 825-28
(1999); Anna Wilde Mathews, Vioxx Recall Raises Questions on FDA's Safety Monitoring,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2004, at B1; see also FDAAA, Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 901(a), 121 Stat.
823, 923 (2007) (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3)(D)) (distinguishing between active
surveillance and Phase IV trials); id. § 905, 121 Stat. at 944 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(k)(3)). Traditionally, the FDA used a passive approach, waiting for manufacturers and
physicians to send in isolated reports, but it has begun to pursue more active forms of surveil-
lance, including efforts to mine the databases of public and private health insurers or to
establish sentinel systems that would provide early information about emerging hazards. See
Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Medicare's Will May Be FDA's Way, L.A. TIMES, June 5, 2005, at
A1; David Brown, Blood-Pressure Drugs Linked to Birth Defects; Window of Safepy in First
Tremester Refuted, WASH. POST, June 8, 2006, at A12; see also Charles L. Bennett et al., The
Research on Adverse Drug Events and Reports (RADAR) Project, 293 JAMA 2131, 2132-33,
2137 (2005) (describing a collaborative effort supported by federal grants).
33. See Conk, supra note 4, at 857, 860-61, 873, 878-80.
34. See Steenburg, supra note 6, at 372-74. I do not mean to question the value of a
"lifecycle approach" for identifying and managing risks associated with medical technologies
or to suggest that the FDA has embraced the idea as fully as it should. See INST. OF MED., THE
FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 4-5
(Alina Baciu et al. eds., 2007). Further expanding the existing tort obligations of prescription
drug manufacturers strikes me, however, as a clumsy way of pursuing such a goal.
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also seemed worried that drug companies do not pay sufficient attention
to patterns of off-label use and associated risks,35 but his surveillance
requirement would add little to the well-recognized existing obligation to
anticipate (and potentially warn against) uses apart from those in-
tended.36
Separately, Conk wanted warnings to reach patients,37 though he
never bothered to confront the debate over the learned intermediary doc-
trine." Most astonishingly, he called on sellers to satisfy a broader duty
to educate patients,39 much like the informed consent duty of physi-
cians,4 which would mean laying out the pros and cons not just of their
products but also competing drugs (and non-product substitutes).4 ' Such
35. See Conk, supra note 4, at 873, 879-80; id. at 856 & n.142 (suggesting incorrectly
that section 6 of the Products Liability Restatement relates only to FDA-approved uses); id. at
857 & n. 145 (suggesting incorrectly that the Restatement deals with postapproval risks under
the more forgiving standard for post-sale warnings).
36. See, e.g., Knowlton v. Deseret Med., Inc., 930 F.2d 116, 122-23 (1st Cir. 1991);
Rhoto v. Ribando, 504 So. 2d 1119, 1124 (La. Ct. App. 1987); Docken v. Ciba-Geigy, 739
P.2d 591, 593-95 (Or. Ct. App. 1987); see also Richards v. Upjohn Co., 625 P.2d 1192, 1196
(N.M. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that, because an intramuscular antibiotic solution "had been on
the market for over ten years before the recommendation to use it topically was withdrawn,"
the manufacturer may have had a specific duty to warn against what was now an off-label
use).
37. See Conk, supra note 4, at 875-80; see also id. at 805 (calling "for recognition of a
robust common law duty of producers of medical products owed to those who use their prod-
ucts .... centered on an explicit duty of manufacturers to advance the patient's ability to make
an informed choice regarding the course of medical treatment").
38. See Noah, supra note 2, at pt.HI.A-B.
39. See Conk, supra note 4, at 872-74, 877-78; id. at 872 ("declar[ing] patient empow-
erment as a goal," and "seek[ing] to integrate the manufacturer's duty with that of the
physician").
40. See Noah, supra note 31, at 366-67 ("These additional obligations [to disclose
reasonable alternatives and the benefits of a recommended procedure] suggest the extent to
which the duty to secure informed consent has ... moved beyond a duty to warn of risks to
include a broader obligation to educate the patient."); Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed
Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 910 (1991) ("[A] health care provider's obligations toward pa-
tients are in several respects more onerous than ... those that product manufacturers and
sellers owe to their purchasers and consumers."); id. at 921-23 (elaborating); see also Mat-
thies v. Mastromonaco, 733 A.2d 456, 461 (N.J. 1999) ("[A] physician need not recite all the
risks and benefits of each potential appropriate antibiotic when writing a prescription for
treatment of an upper respiratory infection."); Joan H. Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed
Consent in an Era of Health Care Cost Containment, 85 IowA L. REv. 261, 305-37 (1999)
(explaining the practical limitations of the duty to disclose reasonable alternatives); Hunter L.
Prillaman, A Physician's Duty to Inform of Newly Developed Therapy, 6 J. CONTEmp. HEALTH
L. & POL'Y 43, 52-58 (1990) (discussing the difficulty that arises in deciding whether an
alternative medical treatment is sufficiently accepted so that it must be disclosed); Gerald F.
Tietz, Informed Consent in the Prescription Drug Context: The Special Case, 61 WASH. L.
REV. 367, 406-17 (1986) (urging stricter application of the informed consent duty with re-
spect to prescribing).
41. See Conk, supra note 4, at 872-73 ("[Mledical product makers must compare their
products' risks and benefits--based on real-world data-both to competing products of the
same class, and to recognized competing therapeutic options, including those the manufac-
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42
an obligation would be both unprecedented and unwise, in part because
distant manufacturers of mass-produced goods cannot (and should not
even attempt to) supplant the role of physicians when the time comes to
help patients understand the full range of therapeutic options and make
choices tailored to their particular circumstances.
Finally, Conk argued that, contrary to recent pronouncements by
the FDA,43 manufacturers may act unilaterally to revise approved
turer's product does not serve."); id. at 874 ("[M]edical product stewardship would require
stent manufacturers to effectively inform their ultimate consumers-cardiac patients-of the
comparative benefits of drug-eluting stent implants versus not only bare metal stents, but also
coronary bypass graft surgery."). In support of this illustration, he pointed to criticisms lodged
by the president of the Society of Thoracic Surgeons. See id. at 873. Although Phase IV re-
search of these products continues, see Sylvia P. Westphal, Concerns Prompt Some Hospitals
to Pare Use of Drug-Coated Stents, WALL ST. J., June 22, 2006, at Al, Conk seemed entirely
oblivious to his source's obvious conflict of interest (insofar as stents compete against coro-
nary bypass surgery), see Lars Noah, Medicine's Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard
Diffusion of Knowledge in the Biomedical Community, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 422-23 &
n.212, 428 & n.240 (2002).
42. See, e.g., Graham v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 350 F.3d 496, 514 (6th Cir. 2003) (reject-
ing a claim that the manufacturer of oral polio vaccine had a duty to inform physicians that
inactivated polio vaccine (IPV) represented the preferred choice); Johnson v. Am. Cyanamid
Co., 718 P.2d 1318, 1326 (Kan. 1986) (same, though based on the fact that IPV was not com-
mercially available at the relevant time); Demmler v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 671 A.2d
1151, 1154-55 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (rejecting an inadequate warning claim for failure to
specify the appropriate therapy in the event that a listed side effect occurred); see also Kearl v.
Lederle Labs., 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 468 (Ct. App. 1985) ("[W]hatever duty a manufacturer may
have to inform of risks associated with nonuse of a product, such a duty most certainly cannot
be imposed when the relationship between use and nonuse is statistically close ... ");
Calabrese v. Trenton State Col., 392 A.2d 600, 604 (N.J. App. Div. 1978) (same, rabies vac-
cine), aff'd, 413 A.2d 315, 316 n.1 (N.J. 1980); cf. Powell v. Standard Brand Paint Co., 212
Cal. Rptr. 395, 398 (Ct. App. 1985) ("[T]he law does not require a manufacturer to study and
analyze the products of others and to warn users of risks of those products."). But cf May v.
Dafoe, 611 P.2d 1275, 1277-78 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980) (distinguishing the seller of hospital
equipment from drug manufacturers). In other contexts, the limited post-sale duty to warn
does not include an obligation to inform of technological advances. See, e.g., Rogers v. Clark
Equip. Co., 744 N.E.2d 364, 370 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001); Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Mfg.
Co., 861 P.2d 1299, 1309-15 (Kan. 1993); id. at 1311 ("A variety of courts have found that a
manufacturer does not have a post-sale duty to notify product purchasers or users of changes
in the state of the art concerning the safe use of the product."), DeSantis v. Frick Co., 745 A.2d
624, 630-31 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999).
43. See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug
and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934-36 (Jan. 24, 2006) (announcing administra-
tive preemption of failure-to-warn claims involving prescription drugs); see also Supplemental
Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs, Biologics, and Medical De-
vices, 73 Fed. Reg. 49,603, 49,605-06, 49,609 (Aug. 22, 2008) (reiterating its implied
preemption arguments); id. at 49,609 (amending 21 C.FR. § 314.70(c)(6)); cf. Anne Wilde
Mathews et al., Bill Raising FDA's Powers Nears Passage, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2007, at A6
(reporting that plaintiffs' lawyers had persuaded Congress to include language in new legisla-
tion that might undercut the agency's implied preemption statement).
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labeling in order to communicate new risk information." Although that
question is far closer than he appreciated,45 the agency certainly would
never tolerate any of the other additional items that he would want to
see included, whether related to the risks and benefits associated with
off-label uses," cross-references to other drugs,1 comparative efficacy
claims (unless it has approved them),48 full risk information directed to
44. See Conk, supra note 4, at 863-64 & n. 171; see also David A. Kessler & David C.
Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA's Efforts to Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96
GEO. L.J. 461,473-83,495 (2008).
45. See, e.g., Colacicco v. Apotex Inc., 521 F3d 253, 274-76 (3d Cir. 2008) (deferring
to the FDA's implied preemption analysis), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 1578 (2009); see also Peter H.
Schuck, FDA Preemption of State Tort Law in Drug Regulation: Finding the Sweet Spot, 13
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 73, 82-102 (2008); Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism in Action:
FDA Regulatory Preemption in Pharmaceutical Cases in State Versus Federal Courts, 15 J.L.
& POL'Y 1013, 1032-46 (2007). But see In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 489 F. Supp. 2d
230, 273-78 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding the FDA's position unpersuasive); Jackson v. Pfizer,
Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 964, 968 & n.3 (D. Neb. 2006) (same).
46. See Lars Noah, Constraints on the Off-Label Uses of Prescription Drug Products,
16 J. PROD. & Toxics LIAB. 139, 156-59 (1994); id. at 140 (noting the "FDA's countervailing
concems that precautionary labeling with regard to off-label uses could unnecessarily detract
from other more important prescribing information and may instead amount to impermissible
promotion of uses that have not been approved"); see also id. at 144-46 (explaining why ef-
forts to force drug companies to test off-label uses were properly rejected); Thomas Scarlett,
The Relationship Among Adverse Drug Reaction Reporting, Drug Labeling, Product Liability,
and Federal Preemption, 46 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 31, 40 (1991) ("[The FDA] is conscious
of the problem of information overload ... [and] would not acquiesce in defensive labeling
that lacked medical support."). The FDA has leaned on companies to file efficacy supplements
or to remove warnings when off-label uses have become well-accepted. See, e.g., Fran Kritz,
FDA Seeks to Add Drugs' New Uses to Labels, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1994, at Fl1 (asthma
drug terbutaline used for preterm labor); Marie McCullough, Firm Clarifies Its Warning on
Drug Also Used to Induce Labor, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 4, 2001, at A3 (anti-ulcer drug miso-
prostol used to speed delivery).
47. See 21 C.ER. § 201.6(a) (2008) ("Among representations in the labeling of a drug
which render such drug misbranded is a false or misleading representation with respect to
another drug .... "); id. § 201.80(i)(6) ("Unqualified recommendations for which data are
lacking with the specific drug or class of drugs, especially treatment using another drug ...
may not be stated unless specific data or scientific rationale exist to support safe and effective
use."); id. § 201.57(c)( 1)(vi) (same for newer drugs); see also Melody Petersen, Label Issues
Are Delaying Generic Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2003, at Cl; cf. Labeling for Oral Hypogly-
cemic Drugs of the Sulfonylurea Class, 49 Fed. Reg. 14,303, 14,327 (Apr. 11, 1984) ("The
'Warning' section of oral hypoglycemic drug labeling will retain the statement that the patient
should be informed of the potential risks and advantages of these drugs and of alternative
modes of therapy.").
48. See Noah, supra note 41, at 446; see also Bernhardt v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 4042
LMM, 2000 WL 1738645 (S.D.N.Y Nov. 22, 2000) (refusing to issue an injunction ordering a
drug manufacturer to notify physicians and patients about the results of a large study finding
that its antihypertensive agent worked less well than diuretics because this presented an issue
for the FDA to resolve). The agency does not, however, have any authority to bar third-party
initiatives to produce and publicize such information. See Barry Meier, Doctors, Too, Ask: Is
This Drug Right?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2004, at Cl (describing efforts to conduct and dis-
seminate "evidence-based reviews" of drugs); Christopher Rowland, Consumer Reports Turns
Focus to Prescription Drugs, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 10, 2004, at Al.
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patients,49 disclosures of differences of opinion,5° or even bland
statements about best practices."
In Proctor v. Davis,52 an Illinois appellate court upheld a jury verdict
for the plaintiff in claims against the manufacturer of the corticosteroid
Depo-Medrol® (methyl prednisone acetate) after an ophthalmologist ac-
cidentally injected it directly into his eye. 3 Upjohn clearly knew about
and arguably encouraged the widespread off-label use of Depo-Medrol
49. See, e.g., Henley v. FDA, 77 F.3d 616, 620-21 (2d Cir. 1996) (rejecting challenge to
the agency's decision to remove animal carcinogenicity disclosures from the patient labeling
for oral contraceptives). For instance, during negotiations over the labeling of transdermal
nicotine patches, manufacturers sought to include a stringent pregnancy warning concerning
the teratogenicity of nicotine, but the FDA opted for a milder warning evidently because it did
not want to discourage women who otherwise would have smoked during their pregnancies
from attempting a cessation program using a patch. See Nicotine Replacement Product Direct-
to-Consumer Ads Are "Appropriate Thing to Do ", F-D-C REP. ("The Pink Sheet"), July 20,
1992, at 8, 9; see also Dowhal v. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, 88 P.3d 1, 4-5,
15 (Cal. 2004) (holding that, after the FDA switched these patches to nonprescription status,
its continuing decision against highlighting this information preempted a contrary warning
requirement imposed under state law).
50. See 21 C.F.R. § 1.21(c)(1); see also Karen Baswell, Note, lime for a Change: Why
the FDA Should Require Greater Disclosure of Differences of Opinion on the Safety and Effi-
cacy of Approved Drugs, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1799, 1817-27 (2007) (discussing the history
behind this rule); id. at 1827-32 (proposing revisions that would allow expressions of contrary
opinions in an online clearinghouse); cf Anna Wilde Mathews & Thomas M. Burton, Invasive
Procedure: After Medtronic Lobbying Push, the FDA Had a Change of Heart, WALL ST. J.,
July 9, 2004, at Al (describing stent graft manufacturer's success in blocking a paper written
by agency scientists that had recommended surgery for most aortic aneurysm patients). Con-
gress recently mandated that the FDA post internal differences of opinion concerning an
approval decision on its web site. See FDAAA, Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 916, 121 Stat. 823, 959
(2007) (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(l)(2)(C)(iv)).
51. See Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulated
Biomedical Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 603, 653 (2003) ("[T]he agency has tried to avoid the
use of product labeling to communicate statements that have more to do with good profes-
sional practice than the intrinsic risks of a drug when used as intended."); see also Labeling
and Prescription Drug Advertising; Content and Format for Labeling for Human Prescription
Drugs, 44 Fed. Reg. 37,434, 37,436 (June 26, 1979) ("There are potentially many such state-
ments, which, if all are included in drug labeling, would transform labeling into small
textbooks of medicine."). Even if the agency allowed these in professional labeling, it would
never allow such statements in patient labeling (because to do so surely would infuriate physi-
cians). See William J. Curran, Package Inserts for Patients: Informed Consent in the 1980s,
305 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1564, 1565 (1981) ("The protest against this proposal was immediate
and strong in the medical profession .... "); Gina Kolata, Controversy over Study of Diabetes
Drugs Continues for Nearly a Decade, 203 SCIENCE 986 (1979).
52. 682 N.E.2d 1203 (I11. App. Ct. 1997).
53. See id. at 1206, 1215. The jury rejected malpractice claims against Dr. Davis, and
the appellate court rejected Upjohn's decision-causation argument, agreeing that the trial
judge acted properly in excluding evidence that Dr. Davis and the plaintiffs' experts had con-
tinued engaging in this off-label use even after the accident. See id. at 1212, 1213 n.13; id. at
1220-21, 1224 (DiVito, J., dissenting). When the jury credited Dr. Davis's testimony that he
would not have used the drug if Upjohn had warned him of the risks associated with periocu-
lar use, however, it would seem to undercut injury causation insofar as Depo-Medrol had
offered the last best hope of saving Mr. Proctor's deteriorating eye.
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by periocular injection, and it had received a few reports of side effects
associated with accidental intraocular injections,54 but, just a couple of
months before the plaintiff's injury, the FDA had rejected Upjohn's re-
quest to revise the package insert to reflect this information (the trial
judge inexplicably excluded this evidence, which at the very least
seemed relevant to the punitive damage request).' The jury verdict in-
cluded more than $3 million in compensatory damages for the loss of an
eye that, until the physician tried Depo-Medrol, seemed destined for
blindness, 6 plus more than $124 million in punitive damages, which the
trial judge had reduced to $35 million before the appellate court shaved
it to $6 million.57
Even though it focused solely on the adequacy of warnings directed
to physicians (without suggesting any obligation to communicate di-
rectly with patients), the opinion in Proctor offers a cautionary tale about
the consequences of embracing an expansive duty of product steward-
ship. In light of the company's alleged efforts to encourage this off-label
use, coupled with its failure to investigate the drug's toxicity when acci-
dentally injected directly into the eye, the majority agreed that a jury
could have found Upjohn's warnings inadequate (and its conduct outra-
geous!)," in part for failing to disclose that periocular use was not FDA
approved (even though that would have been obvious from the silence in
the indications statement) and that it was not recommended (even though
that would have represented an entirely false statement about the existing
standard of care in the ophthalmological community). 9 In contrast, in a
case involving a different off-label use of Depo-Medrol, another court
properly recognized that the FDA would not have allowed Upjohn to
revise its labeling in this fashion.6°
54. See id. at 1209 & n.9, 1214 n.14; see also id. at 1219-20 (DiVito, J., dissenting)
(explaining that ophthalmologists at the time appreciated this risk).
55. See id. at 1210; id. at 1221-23 (DiVito, J., dissenting).
56. See id. at 1210-11.
57. See id. at 1216.
58. See id. at 1211-15.
59. See id. at 1206 n.1, 1210; id. at 1221 (DiVito, J., dissenting); cf Denise Gellene,
Avastin Use in Eyes Irks Genentech, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2005, at Cl (reporting that ophthal-
mologists have used a colon cancer drug off-label on more than 1,000 patients with macular
degeneration and that the manufacturer "is in discussions with the [FDA] to modify the
Avastin label to state that the drug is not for ophthalmc use").
60. See Hahn v. Richter, 628 A.2d 860, 863 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (involving a failure to
warn of the alleged risk of arachnoiditis associated with intrathecal administration, and credit-
ing testimony from a former FDA Commissioner who had explained that the agency "would
not have allowed Upjohn to contact physicians or send a 'Dear Doctor' letter regarding the
intrathecal use of Depo-Medrol because it was not an approved use for the drug").
Platitudes About "Product Stewardship"
B. "Informed Choice" Proposals
Another proposal would recognize a tort duty to disclose uncertain
risks, for instance when manufacturers have failed to investigate the
teratogenic potential of drugs, coupled with awards of limited damages
not dependent on proving that the drug actually caused a particular in-
jury.6' This idea perplexes me on a number of levels. First, it labors
under a misimpression about longstanding FDA labeling requirements.
The package inserts for prescription drugs routinely provide just such
disclaimers, with subheadings that include, for example, a "pregnancy
category" to reflect what little information exists about possible terato-
genicity.62 Although Bendectin may not have carried such disclaimers,
having left the market just a few years after the FDA's 1979 labeling
format revisions became effective,63 the informed choice proposal
61. See Berger & Twerski, supra note 4, at 259, 287-88. Bendectin served as a primary
illustration of the need for their proposal. See id. at 257-58, 268-69, 288-89; see also David
E. Bernstein, Correspondence, Learning the Wrong Lessons from "An American Tragedy": A
Critique of the Berger-Twerski Informed Choice Proposal, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1961, 1963-67,
1981 (2006) (arguing that the history and scientific record of Bendectin highlights the flaws
with their proposal). In his response to their more general proposal, Bernstein made a number
of other points concerning expert testimony, jury competence, and litigation costs. See id. at
1971-78. In their brief rejoinder, Berger and Twerski responded to some of these points, see
Margaret A. Berger & Aaron D. Twerski, Correspondence, From the Wrong End of the Tele-
scope: A Response to Professor David Bernstein, 104 MICH. L. REv. 1983, 1990-91 (2006),
emphasized that the scientific record on Bendectin looked far different when many of the
plaintiffs' mothers had ingested the drug, see id. at 1985-87, 1989, and admonished Bernstein
for ignoring their more recent (and less easily critiqued) Parlodel illustration, see id. at 1987-
88. As I explain below, however, they failed to respond to some of his other objections (which
applied equally to Bendectin and Parlodel), and all three of the commentators completely
missed a central feature of the current FDA regulations.
62. See Felix v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 540 So. 2d 102, 104 (Fla. 1989) (Accutane);
Nichols v. Cent. Merch., Inc., 817 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991) ("Gantanol was not
contraindicated for use during early pregnancy; the package insert merely stated its effect on a
fetus had not been determined."); see also 21 C.F.R. § 201.80(f)(6)(i) (2008); id.
§ 201.57(c)(9)(i) (same for newer drugs); Labeling and Prescription Drug Advertising; Con-
tent and Format for Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs, 44 Fed. Reg. 37,434, 37,450-52
(June 26, 1979) (explaining the rule). Nowadays, the biggest complaint relates to the fact that
most drugs carry identical statements of uncertainty. See Francesca Lunzer Kritz, Ending
Guesswork on Drugs in Pregnancy, WAsHI. POST, Feb. 26, 2002, at Fl; see also Content and
Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products; Requirements for
Pregnancy and Lactation Labeling, 73 Fed. Reg. 30,831, 30,834, 30,854 (proposed May 29,
2008) (noting that more than sixty percent of drugs fall into category C); id. at 30,838-45
(explaining its proposal to revise the format and content of pregnancy risk statements in pack-
age inserts); Gideon Koren et al., Drugs in Pregnancy, 338 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1128, 1128
(1998). Indeed, regulatory officials all too often use disclamatory "warnings" as a lazy ap-
proach to risk management. See Lars Noah, The Imperative to Warn: Disentangling the "Right
to Know" from the "Need to Know" About Consumer Product Hazards, 11 YALE J. ON REG.
293, 391 (1994) ("[If public disclosure of inconclusive animal data is the goal, risk labeling is
not the appropriate mechanism."); id. at 398 & n.520 (noting the strategy of shaming products
as a way to prompt additional testing); cf id. at 326-32 (contrasting and applauding the FDA's
risk categorization and substantiation requirements for prescription labeling, as illustrated by
the pregnancy categories).
63. At least for some products, however, the FDA had required such warnings long
before this rule became effective. See, e.g., Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 659
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seemingly would have little relevance for prescription drugs sold dur-
ing the last three decades.m Similar subheadings (and disclosures of the
limits or complete absence of testing) cover other subjects, including
use in special populations, 6 5 and the potential for carcinogenicity or
mutagenicity.66 The FDA also occasionally demands revisions in the
package inserts for particular drugs simply to urge physicians to watch
for suspected (but not yet confirmed) side effects.67
n.14 (1st Cir. 1981) (quoting disclaimers that appeared in the package insert for oral contra-
ceptives sold before 1971); cf. 21 C.F.R. § 201.63(a) (2008) (mandating that the labels of all
OTC drugs intended for systemic absorption caution pregnant or nursing women to "seek the
advice of a health professional before using this product"); David DeTar Newbert, Comment,
Drugs During Pregnancy: Dangerous Business-The Continued Movement to Provide Ade-
quate Warnings for the Consumer, 62 NEB. L. REV. 526, 571-76 (1983) (discussing this rule).
Conversely, even after the rule applicable to prescription drugs took effect, some manufactur-
ers apparently failed to comply with it. See David B. Brushwood, Drug Induced Birth Defects:
Difficult Decisions and Shared Responsibilities, 91 W. VA. L. REv. 51, 67-70 (1988).
64. I trust that, if another manufacturer reintroduced Bendectin, it would not have to
provide any such disclosure in light of the now overwhelming evidence that the drug poses no
risk of birth defects. See Determination That Bendectin Was Not Withdrawn from Sale for
Reasons of Safety or Effectiveness, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,190 (Aug. 9, 1999); Michael D. Green,
Safety as an Element of Pharmaceutical Quality: The Respective Roles of Regulation and Tort
Law, 42 ST. Louis U. L.J. 163, 165 (1998) ("The scientific evidence, which is quite well-
developed today, does not support those claims [linking Bendectin to birth defects]."); Gina
Kolata, Controversial Drug Makes a Comeback, N.Y. TimES, Sept. 26, 2000, at Fl. In their
original article, however, Berger and Twerski suggested that Bendectin would require an in-
formed choice warning even today. See Berger & Twerski, supra note 4, at 280 ("In the
Bendectin cases, for example, it is impossible to rule out that the morning sickness remedy is
a mild teratogen that contributed to birth defects in some indeterminate number of cases in
which the causal effect was too low to be detected."); cf. Berger & Twerski, supra note 61, at
1985-87, 1989 (responding to the current evidentiary record by focusing solely on what little
was known prior to 1977).
65. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 201.80(f)(9)(vi) ("'Safety and effectiveness in pediatric pa-
tients have not been established."'); id. § 201.57(c)(9)(iv)(E) (same for newer drugs); id.
§ 201.80(f)(10) (relating to geriatric use); id. § 201.57(c)(9)(v) (same for newer drugs). In
recent amendments to this rule, the FDA also required that labeling include "a succinct de-
scription of the limitations of the usefulness of the drug and any uncertainty about anticipated
clinical benefits:' Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription
Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3989 (Jan. 24, 2006) (codified at 21 C.F.R.
§ 201.57(c)(2)(i)(B)). As with questions about use during pregnancy, most drugs used in pedi-
atric patients traditionally carried disclaimers to indicate the lack of testing in that population.
See ROBERT LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 239-41 (2d ed.
1986).
66. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.80(0(5); id. § 201.57(c)(14)(i) (same for newer drugs); see also
Labeling and Prescription Drug Advertising, 44 Fed. Reg. at 37,450 ("This information may
be of value to physicians in deciding whether to prescribe a particular drug for an indication,
when animal data demonstrate a relationship between the use of the drug and carcinogenesis,
mutagenesis, or impairment of fertility and no comparable human data exist, and when
equally effective alternative drugs that do not present a risk are available."); id. at 37,437
("provid[ing] specific wording for statements in the absence of particular data or informa-
tion").
67. See Thomas M. Burton, FDA to Require Diabetes Warning on Class of Schizophre-
nia Drugs, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2003, at D3; Marc Kaufman, Impotence Drugs Will Get
Blindness Warning, WASH. POST, July 9, 2005, at A6. Admittedly, such items rarely appear in
whatever labeling may reach patients, though Congress recently established a mechanism that
might do so. See FDAAA, Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 915, 121 Stat. 823, 958 (2007) (to be codi-
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Second, assuming for the sake of argument that an FDA-approved
drug failed to include such disclaimers, the existing threat of liability
for failure to warn of knowable risks should continue to provide suffi-
cient incentives for manufacturers to communicate warnings when
preliminary adverse event information comes to light,68 and it also
would reach any questions of limited efficacy. 9 By advocating
fled at 21 U.S.C. § 355(r)(2)(D)) (requiring that the agency maintain a web site that would
include disclosures of preliminary risk information in advance of potential labeling revisions);
David Brown, FDA to List Drugs Being Investigated: Complaints Will Be Posted Quarterly,
WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2008, at A2 ("FDA officials said they realize that the new policy... may
unintentionally alarm some patients.").
68. See supra note 8. I agree that admissibility criteria (and thresholds) geared toward
establishing cause-in-fact (i.e., demanding epidemiological studies and a greater than 2.0
relative risk) have little application when deciding whether a material risk required a warning.
See Berger & Twerski, supra note 4, at 280, 287. In their rejoinder, however, the commenta-
tors argued that juries will never get to hear this testimony about earlier suspicions of an
undisclosed risk. See Berger & Twerski, supra note 61, at 1990 ("Only if each slice of evi-
dence standing alone is sufficient to make out causation under the strictures of Daubert will a
jury ever see the panoply of sources relevant to the determination of whether a risk is mate-
rial."). Evidence of knowability and cause-in-fact need not-indeed, should not-be the same
(though, if plaintiffs cannot secure clearer evidence of general causation after sale but before
trial, then they should lose): the adequacy of the warning will depend on what the defendant
should have known at the time of sale, while causation will depend on what evidence has
accumulated many years later by the time of trial. If, based on the plaintiff's admissible even
though weak (whether epidemiological or not) evidence, a reasonable jury could hold that the
manufacturer breached its duty to warn at the time of sale, but the plaintiff lacks admissible
causation evidence at the time of trial, then the court should reject the claim because the plain-
tiff has suffered no harm at the hands of the defendant. When deciding whether to add a
warning based on emerging data, however, manufacturers will have no confidence that these
early suspicions later will prove to be unfounded, so, if one accepts the deterrent assumptions
that Berger and Twerski make, manufacturers will have an incentive to warn. See Michael
Imbroscio & Gabriel Bell, Adequate Drug Warnings in the Face of Uncertain Causality: The
Learned Intermediary Doctrine and the Need for Clarity, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 847, 858-61,
864-65 (2005). To the extent that they want simple disclaimers of general uncertainty even
before the point of knowability with regard to particular risks, however, why would such a
duty to disclose (to physicians) not fail on grounds of obviousness?
69. See, e.g., Tobin v. Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 993 F2d 528, 537-40 (6th Cir. 1993).
Thus, I disagree with one commentator's recent claim that judges resolving drug products
liability cases focus unduly on questions of safety and "do not consider effectiveness." Anita
Bernstein, Enhancing Drug Effectiveness and Efficacy Through Personal Injury Litigation, 15
J.L. & POL'Y 1051, 1072 (2007); see also id. at 1058 (calling effectiveness "the neglected and
undertheorized younger sibling of prescription drug safety"); id. at 1060 (pointing out that
"the danger of harmful effects can be named in a warning much more easily than the danger of
futility"); id. at 1061 ("explor[ing] the contrary thesis that effectiveness is, and ought to be,
central to personal injury litigation related to prescription drugs"); id. at 1100. Elsewhere,
however, she correctly recognized that effectiveness inevitably gets taken into account when
judging prescription drug defectiveness. See id. at 1084. In contrast, Bernstein's repeated
assertion that the federal regulatory "effectiveness" standard means nothing other than truth-
in-labeling, see id. at 1066-68, 1082, 1098, and her passing suggestion that the FDA does not
mandate labeling about comparative effectiveness, see id. at 1084-85, have no foundation, see
infra notes 83 & 87. If a therapeutic failure occurs because of subpotency in a particular dose,
an injured patient clearly could allege a manufacturing defect, and, if it occurs because a prop-
erly manufactured product does not work at all, then the patient could allege a design defect
(but, if the drug only happens to fail in a particular patient, then, at most, the patient might
have an informational defect claim in the event that the manufacturer exaggerated effective-
ness or failed to specify known limitations on use in certain patient subgroups). The tricky
Spring 2009]
376 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 15:359
disclaimers of entirely speculative risks, 0 however, the proponents of
the informed choice proposal completely ignore the hazards associated
with overwarning,7' and they disregard FDA restrictions applicable to
such labeling.72
Moreover, if the media has generated ultimately unfounded hysteria
by propagating misinformation about risks (as happened, for example,
with respect to Bendectin and birth defects, silicone-gel breast implants
issues in therapeutic failure (as opposed to adverse side effect) cases relate to causation and
damages, but, apart from a brief discussion of emotional distress, see Bernstein, supra, at
1080-82, she never mentions (much less grapples with) these complexities, see, e.g., Willis v.
Wu, 607 S.E.2d 63, 66 (S.C. 2004) ("A 'wrongful pregnancy' or 'wrongful contraception'
action is brought by the parent of a healthy but unplanned child, seeking damages from [inter
alia] a ... pharmaceutical manufacturer who allegedly was negligent in ... manufacturing a
contraceptive prescription or device."); Lars Noah, An Inventory of Mathematical Blunders in
Applying the Loss-of-a-Chance Doctrine, 24 REV. LtTIG. 369, 377-78 & n.32 (2005) (explain-
ing that only in medical malpractice cases do courts recognize claims for the loss of a less-
than-even chance for a better outcome); see also Rivera v. Wyeth-Ayerst Lab., 283 E3d 315,
319-21 (5th Cir. 2002) (dismissing, for lack of standing, a nationwide class action lawsuit
brought on behalf of healthy users and insurers seeking to recover only their economic losses
after the withdrawal of Duracto prompted by safety concerns); New Jersey Citizen Action v.
Schering-Plough Corp., 842 A.2d 174, 177-78 (N.J. App. Div. 2003) (similar conclusion on
claims based on direct-to-consumer advertising for Claritin®). See generally Moin A. Yahya,
Can I Sue Without Being Injured?: Why the Benefit of the Bargain Theory for Product Liabil-
ity Is Bad Law and Bad Economics, 3 GEo. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 83 (2005).
70. I would have found their proposal far more compelling if they had limited them-
selves to the following type of situation: clinical trials or epidemiological studies reveal a
statistically significant increased relative risk that did not exceed 2.0 and a manufacturer, con-
fident that no amount of stratification, reliance on differential diagnosis, or future research
could establish specific causation, decided to breach its duty to warn (and flagrantly ignore
FDA requirements) by declining to mention this risk. Their discussion of material risks, how-
ever, instead imagined a duty to communicate even the most speculative information.
71. See Thomas v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 949 F.2d 806, 816 n.40 (5th Cir. 1992)
(noting that the imposition of liability for a failure to warn about reported but unconfirmed
adverse experiences with prescription medications could "force drug manufacturers to list, and
perhaps contraindicate, every possible risk in order to avoid the possibility of liability"); Doe
v. Miles Lab., Inc., 927 F.2d 187, 194 (4th Cir. 1991) ("If pharmaceutical companies were
required to warn of every suspected risk that could possibly attend the use of a drug, the con-
suming public would be so barraged with warnings that it would undermine the effectiveness
of these warnings... "); Bernstein, supra note 61, at 1978-79 & n.108; Noah, supra note 62,
at 381-91; see also id. at 379-80 ("It seems to be only a matter of time before a plaintiff suc-
ceeds in bringing an inadequate warning claim premised on the argument that, although a
completely accurate statement of the risk had been provided, the pertinent warning lacked
sufficient prominence because it was lost among the clutter of too many other cautionary
statements on the label."); Noah, supra note 41, at 404-06, 455-56 (explaining that physicians
are not immune to problems of information overload); Scott Hensley, Liability Worries Cloud
Drug Labels, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2005, at D3; cf Janssen Pharm., Inc. v. Bailey, 878 So. 2d
31, 55-59 (Miss. 2004) (noting that plaintiffs had argued "that Propulsid became a victim of
label fatigue" by virtue of the five revisions to the package insert (sometimes accompanied by
"Dear Doctor" letters) issued over the course of five years to convey increasingly alarming
risk information, and concluding that this presented a question for the fact-finder); Richard A.
Epstein, Legal Liability for Medical Innovation, 81 CARDOZO L. REV. 1139, 1150 (1987)
("The full costs of overwarning would only be known if legal actions were available to people
deterred from taking needed therapy by excessive warnings.").
72. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
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and autoimmune disease, and childhood vaccines and autism),73 then
perhaps such fear-mongering should qualify as a superseding cause even
though entirely foreseeable. Although many commentators have criti-
cized direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription drugs,74 plaintiffs'
lawyers do their share of tacky (and potentially hazardous) direct adver-
tising to users of such products, 5 though they would not have to fear tort
claims brought by patients who discontinued a prescribed (and still net
beneficial) course of treatment-or simply became anxious-in response
to exaggerated risk information appearing in ads trolling for clients.6
73. See Bernstein, supra note 61, at 1965, 1973, 1976-77, 1980 n.116, 1981; David
Brown, Scientist's Two Roles in Study May Conflict; Data Culled for Lawyer in Autism Case,
WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 2004, at A10 (reporting that the author of a controversial study linking
autism to a type of vaccine had failed to disclose his closely related work for a plaintiff's law-
yer done under a grant of nearly $90,000 from a legal aid society); Gardiner Harris, Measles
Cases Grow in Number, and Officials Blame Parents' Fear of Autism, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22,
2008, at A16; Shankar Vedantam, Study Finds No Autism Link in Vaccine; Digestive Problems,
MMR Scrutinized, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 2008, at A2; cf Wendy Wagner, When All Else Fails:
Regulating Risky Products Through Tort Litigation, 95 GEo. L.J. 693, 714-20 (2007) (defend-
ing the breast implant litigation for promoting tardy safety research).
74. See Julie M. Donohue et al., A Decade of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Pre-
scription Drugs, 357 NEw ENG. J. MED. 673, 674 (2007); Matthew F. Hollon, Editorial,
Direct-to-Consumer Advertising: A Haphazard Approach to Health Promotion, 293 JAMA
2030 (2005); Richard L. Kravitz, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs:
Implications for the Patient-Physician Relationship, 284 JAMA 2244 (2000); Nat Ives, FDA
Ponders Pros and Cons of the Ways Prescription Drugs Are Promoted to Consumers, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 29, 2003, at C 11; Bruce Japsen, AMA Urges a No-Ad Period for New Drugs, CHI.
TRIB., June 15, 2006, at 1; see also Lars Noah, Advertising Prescription Drugs to Consumers:
Assessing the Regulatory and Liability Issues, 32 GA. L. REV. 141, 169-79 (1997) (summariz-
ing and responding to some of the earlier critiques).
75. See Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, A Prescription for Drug Liability and
Regulation, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 135, 166 & n.204 (2005); Chen-Sen Wu, Distributive Justice in
Pharmaceutical Torts: Justice Where Justice Is Due?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Fall 2006, at
207, 223-24; Mary Flood, Drug Doubts Put Lawyers in Motion, Hous. CHRON., June 10,
2007, at Bus. 1 (reporting that plaintiffs' attorneys use newspaper and television ads and
"case-soliciting Web sites that already look like a pharmacy's inventory, except that the drugs
listed are alleged to cause harm," and adding that the manufacturer of the latest target (the
diabetes drug Avandia ®) expressed concern that "lawyer ads could frighten patients into dis-
continuing their medicine, which could endanger their health"); id. (noting that one Houston
firm's phone number is "I-800-BAD-DRUG"); Joseph P. Fried, Specialty Lawyers Gear up
for Suits over Two Medications, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2000, § 1, at 28; cf. Berger & Twerski,
supra note 61, at 1984 ("Bernstein bemoans the withdrawal of this useful drug from the mar-
ket because of a bogus scare created by avaricious plaintiff's lawyers."). One of my favorites
aired during the summer of 2008, from a series of ads run by the firm Ferrer Poirot & Wans-
brough on various cable channels, was styled as a "Medical Alert!" and did not focus on any
particular drug but instead a class of serious side effects (Stevens Johnson syndrome and toxic
epidermal necrolysis) allegedly associated with two dozen-mostly still marketed, and many
OTC-pharmaceutical products. One of the firm's latest TV spots (focusing on the risk of
diabetes associated with the atypical antipsychotic drug Seroquelo) helpfully tells prospective
clients not to discontinue treatment without first checking with their doctors.
76. Cf. Bailey v. Huggins Diagnostic & Rehab. Ctr., Inc., 952 P.2d 768, 770-73 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1997) (rejecting tort claims against the author of a book that had exaggerated the
risks associated with mercury in dental amalgam).
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Third, the proponents of this idea cabin their duty of informed
choice in ways that make little sense given their underlying arguments.
They would allow some unspecified measure of damages for dignitary
harm as well as for emotional distress," but they fail to offer a persuasive
explanation for limiting such awards to plaintiffs who develop an injury
with a suspected but unproven link to the drug.7" In addition, they limit
their proposal to an indeterminate category of "lifestyle" drugs.7 9 Finally,
77. See Berger & Twerski, supra note 4, at 280-86 (conceding that little case law sup-
ports their approach). Apart from a passing reference, see id. at 286 & n.142, the authors
entirely failed to discuss the most directly applicable (and largely adverse) decisional law.
First, many courts have rejected "medical monitoring" claims, which represent attempts to
circumvent causation and injury requirements (in effect, ordering drug manufacturers and
other defendants in toxic tort litigation to assist in the production of evidence that might later
help to establish causation). See supra note 28. Second, courts generally have rejected fear of
malfunction claims (typically in medical device cases). See Angus v. Shiley Inc., 989 F.2d
142, 147-48 (3d Cir. 1993); Walus v. Pfizer, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 41, 44-45 (D.N.J. 1993);
Pfizer, Inc. v. Farsian, 682 So. 2d 405, 407-08 (Ala. 1996), conformed to certified question, 97
F.3d 508 (11th Cir. 1996). If a medical device manufacturer recalls an implant, courts have
allowed recipients to recover the costs associated explant surgery and accompanying emo-
tional distress. See, e.g., Larsen v. Pacesetter Sys., Inc., 837 P.2d 1273, 1286-87 (Haw. 1992).
If, however, explant surgery is not medically-indicated but undertaken at the patient's insis-
tence, courts have rejected such claims. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Medtronic, Inc., 439 N.W.2d 151
(Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
78. See Berger & Twerski, supra note 4, at 275 ("In a causation-free informed choice
cause of action, a prima facie case for liability is established when a drug manufacturer fails to
warn about a material risk and plaintiff subsequently suffers from that undisclosed risk."); id.
at 283-86 & n. 137. Once they unlink the requirement to establish injury causation, the denial
of a right to make a fully informed choice seems no different even if the plaintiff fails to de-
velop the feared injury. See Bernstein, supra note 61, at 1980 n.113. After all, if I understand
their proposal correctly, plaintiffs would recover even if defendants could prove that some-
thing other than their product caused the feared injury. In one peculiar case, a court held that a
warning might be inadequate even if the risk of the very injury suffered by the plaintiff was
clearly disclosed, on the grounds that the plaintiff might have been deterred from taking the
drug had the risk of some other more serious injury been fully disclosed. See Sanderson v.
Upjohn Co., 578 F. Supp. 338, 339-40 (D. Mass. 1984); see also McMahon v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
774 F.2d 830, 834-35 (7th Cir. 1985). But cf Canesi v. Wilson, 685 A.2d 49, 54 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1996), aff'd in part, 730 A.2d 805 (N.J. 1999).
79. See Berger & Twerski, supra note 4, at 259, 272, 288 & n.148; id. at 279 (imagin-
ing a drug that "has little therapeutic value and provides only aesthetic or palliative relief');
see also id. at 269-70 (using Parlodel, which allegedly "created gratuitous risk with very little
benefit" in lactation suppression, especially compared to the use of OTC analgesics for this
same purpose, to justify the recognition of a new type of failure-to-warn claim that would not
require proof of causation); cf. Bernstein, supra note 61, at 1967-68 (disputing their sugges-
tion that the morning sickness remedy Bendectin qualified as a lifestyle drug, explaining that,
in severe cases, it could reduce dehydration and the accompanying need for hospitalization
and risks of fetal harm). In their rejoinder, they never responded to Bernstein's argument that
Bendectin served genuine therapeutic purposes; instead, Berger and TWerski adopted even
more extreme rhetoric to make their semantic point. See Berger & Twerski, supra note 61, at
1989 ("When one seeks to huckster drugs as if they were M&M's, brutal honesty is called
for."); id. at 1992 (referring to decisions "to imbibe non-therapeutic drugs' as if these
amounted to alcoholic beverages). For a criticism of this purported distinction, see infra Part
III.C. Also, why stop at (lifestyle) drugs? See, e.g., Tara Parker-Pope, Experts Revive Debate
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the informed choice proposal would obligate manufacturers to commu-
nicate only with physicians,'" which would accomplish nothing unless
physicians passed along the disclaimers.
Taking a page from the informed choice proposal, one commentator
advocated expanding tort duties in order to respond to the inadequate
testing of prescription drugs in children."' Pediatric research poses all
sorts of tricky bioethical questions," however, and drug manufacturers
may avoid enrolling children (or pregnant women or the elderly) for en-
tirely defensible reasons when developing investigational products not
intended for use in such subpopulations. Assuming that labeling accu-
rately communicates what the seller knows about the safety and efficacy
of the prescription product in different user populations,83 why impose
over Cellphones and Cancer, N.Y TIMES, June 3, 2008, at F5; see also Lars Noah, Managing
Biotechnology's [R]evolution: Has Guarded Enthusiasm Become Benign Neglect?, 11 VA. J.L.
& TECH. 4, 54-59 (2006) (ridiculing a proposed new tort duty to disclose through labeling the
use of genetically modified organisms in the production of food products).
80. Compare Berger & Twerski, supra note 61, at 1990-91; id. at 1991-92 ("The Vioxx
episode demonstrates-as did Bendectin and Parlodel-that current tort law does not provide
adequate incentives for pharmaceutical companies to supply physicians with enough informa-
tion so that they can notify their patients of the risks they run when taking a drug that offers
little or no therapeutic benefits... "); Berger & Twerski, supra note 4, at 278 ("All a court
need decide is whether the signs of risk and their potential gravity were sufficiently strong to
require a drug manufacturer to alert physicians so they in turn can provide information to
patients that will enable them to make a meaningful choice."), with id. at 279-80 ("[B]eing
professionally trained to assess risk, [physicians] will not be prone to deem highly speculative
risk as worthy of disclosure."); id. at 279 ("Admittedly, there is little social utility in providing
information that is so tentative and unreliable that it will serve no purpose other than to
frighten patients who need the drug away from its use."); see also Bernstein, supra note 61, at
1969 n.54 (pointing to the incongruity of their reliance on a pair of polio vaccine cases where
the manufacturers had warned health care professionals but not patients of a remote risk).
81. See Susanne L. Flanders, Note, A Tough Pill to Swallow: The Insurmountable Bur-
den in Toxic Tort Claims Against Manufacturers of Children's Medications, 16 J.L. & POL'Y
305, 308, 315-18, 338-41, 348-55 (2007) (focusing on (primarily OTC) drugs marketed for
use in children, but making broader claims that would include a duty to engage in pediatric
testing of prescription drugs marketed solely for use by adults). The same sorts of arguments
might extend to other groups traditionally excluded from clinical trials (e.g., pregnant women,
the elderly, and minorities).
82. See Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The Legal Ethics of Pediatric Research, 57 DUKE
L.J. 517 (2007); Paul Litton, Non-Beneficial Pediatric Research and the Best Interests Stan-
dard: A Legal and Ethical Reconciliation, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 359 (2008);
John Solomon, Drug Testing on Foster Children: A Federal Probe Found AIDS Researchers
Violated Rules, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 17, 2005, at A2; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Proposal to Test
Smallpox Vaccine in Young Children Sets off Ethics Debate, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 5, 2002, at A14;
U.S. Health Agency Stops Autism Study, NEWSDAY, Sept. 18, 2008, at A33 (reporting that a
planned clinical trial of chelation therapy for autism, "called an unethical experiment on chil-
dren' had been cancelled); see also Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807 (Md.
2001) (lambasting negligent oversight of a study to compare different methods of lead paint
abatement in housing).
83. See Robert Temple, Commentary on "The Architecture of Government Regulation
of Medical Products", 82 VA. L. REv. 1877, 1888 (1996) ("In some cases, a relatively toxic
drug will be identified as a 'second-line,' a drug to be used only in people who cannot tolerate,
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liability when an unexpected injury occurs in a subpopulation not stud-
ied (and, therefore, not an indicated use)? 4 Package inserts serve, first
and foremost, to define for health care professionals the range of uses
and users that have undergone rigorous study and FDA review.85 A duty
to investigate all foreseeable uses to which health care professionals
might put an approved drug would be entirely unmanageable, and it
or do not respond to, safer agents."); Chris Adams, Trial Judge: At FDA, Approving Cancer
Treatments Can Be an Ordeal-Besieged by Desperate Families, Dr. Wirschfeld Weighs 7ny
Advances in Drugs-No Such Thing as a Home Run, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2002, at AI (re-
porting that, after initially rejecting Eloxatin" as a "first line" therapy for colorectal cancer
patients because the manufacturer had not shown extended survival, the FDA approved the
drug as a "second line" treatment based on a trial demonstrating tumor shrinkage in nine per-
cent of patients who had not responded to chemotherapy); Andrew Pollack, After a Long
Struggle, Cancer Drug Wins Approval, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2003, at CI (reporting that the
FDA approved Velcade ® for multiple myeloma patients who have relapsed after trying at least
two other treatments).
84. See Robak v. Abbott Labs., 797 F Supp. 475, 476 (D. Md. 1992) ("Certainly, no
manufacturer need explicitly spell out all of the conditions for which a drug is not indicated.").
Obviously, if a seller knows of widespread off-label pediatric use, it cannot fail to disclose
known risks in that foreseeable-though unintended-user population; similarly, if a seller
knows of widespread off-label use for a different condition (or through a different method of
administration), then it may have to disclose known risks. See Noah, supra note 46, at 159-62;
Kaspar J. Stoffelmayr, Comment, Products Liability and "Off-Label" Uses of Prescription
Drugs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 275, 299-305 (1996). Why, however, suggest that the seller must
comprehensively study safety and efficacy in every conceivable but unintended use or user?
Cf Medics Pharm. Corp. v. Newman, 378 S.E.2d 487, 488-89 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (recogniz-
ing a duty to test the safety of off-label uses); Mitchell Oates, Note, Facilitating Informed
Medical Treatment Through Production and Disclosure of Research into Off-Label Uses of
Pharmaceuticals, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1272, 1280-86, 1307-08 (2005) (explaining that
manufacturers have only limited incentives to produce information about the efficacy of off-
label uses). See generally David C. Radley et al., Off-Label Prescribing Among Office-Based
Physicians, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021 (2006); Rita Rubin, More Studies Urged for
Off-Label Drugs, USA TODAY, Nov. 25, 2008, at 7D; Bernadette Tansey, Why Doctors Pre-
scribe Off Label, S.F CHRON., May 1, 2005, at Al2.
85. See Joe Collier & Ike Iheanacho, The Pharmaceutical Industry as an Informant,
360 LANCET 1405, 1405 (2002) ("Although the primary function of drug companies is to
develop and market drugs, these companies spend more time and resources generating, gather-
ing, and disseminating information."); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5
YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 717, 717-18 (2005) ("Drugs are information-rich chemi-
cals that in many respects are more akin to other information products ... than they are to
other chemicals .... Creating new molecules has become relatively cheap, but determining
which molecules are safe and effective for which therapeutic purposes has remained stub-
bornly expensive. ); Lars Noah, Authors, Publishers, and Products Liability: Remedies
for Defective Information in Books, 77 OR. L. REV. 1195, 1212 (1998) ("[D]rug companies are
actually engaged in the business of producing and selling information for use by patients and
their physicians .... [T]he product defectiveness inquiry depends entirely on the information
accompanying the product, such as the indications and contraindications for use."); see also
Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 391 (1998) ("At greater than approved dosages, not
only do the risks of tragic side effects (known and unknown) increase, but there is no basis on
the testing that has been performed for supposing that the drug's benefits outweigh these in-
creased risks.").
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would threaten to deprive intended users of-or at least delay their ac-
cess to-a valuable product.
C. Are "Lifestyle" Drugs Different?
When they allow design defect claims to proceed, some courts have
emphasized that not all prescription drugs offer equally high utility.86 In
making product approval decisions, which require proof of both safety
and effectiveness, the FDA routinely struggles with such questions.87
Obviously, the agency will tolerate substantial risks for drugs that may• 88
save lives, while products that treat simple conditions or offer only
symptomatic relief will not get approved unless fairly benign.89 Between
86. See, e.g., Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1195, 1197-98 (Alaska 1992);
Bryant v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 585 S.E.2d 723, 727 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003); Freeman v.
Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827, 839-40 (Neb. 2000); Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb &
Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 780-82 (R.I. 1988).
87. See, e.g., E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Bowen, 870 F.2d 678, 681-86 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (upholding the FDA's decision to withdraw approval of drugs where the agency found
no "medical significance" to the use of antifungal ingredients intended to reduce candidal
overgrowth after a course of antibiotics); Warner-Lambert Co. v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 147, 154-
56 (3d Cir. 1986) (rejecting the plaintiff's claim that "'effectiveness' as used in the Act means
only that the drug will have the effect the manufacturer claims for it" and concluding that the
demonstration of effectiveness must include evidence of a therapeutic level of action com-
pared with placebo); see also Rob Stein, Medication Under a Microscope: Studies Raise
Questions About Drugs' Efficacy Against Disease, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2008, at A2. FDA
regulations define "effectiveness" in terms of "clinically significant" outcomes. See 21 C.F.R.
§ 330.10(a)(4)(ii) (2008) (nonprescription drugs); id. § 601.25(d)(2) (biologics).
88. See Temple, supra note 83, at 1888 ("For serious diseases, especially those poorly
treated by available therapy, considerable toxicity is acceptable, and labeling is used to at-
tempt to guide physicians in detecting and mitigating harm."); Ron Winslow, What Makes a
Drug Too Risky? There's No Easy Answer, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 2005, at BI. In reviewing
high priority (potentially lifesaving) drugs, the agency has become more willing to accept
"surrogate markers" for clinical endpoints. See 21 C.ER. §§ 314.510, 601.41. For example, in
the case of new cancer treatments, tumor shrinkage might substitute for evidence of extended
survival times. See Anna Wilde Mathews, Are Long Trials Always Needed for New Drugs?,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2004, at BI; cf Andrew Pollack, FD.A. Restricts Access to Cancer
Drug, Citing Ineffectiveness, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2005, at C2 (reporting that the FDA ap-
proved Iressa® for lung cancer based on a fairly small clinical trial that showed tumor
shrinkage in ten percent of patients who had not responded to chemotherapy but rescinded its
approval two years later after the sponsor submitted postapproval clinical trials that showed no
improvement in survival).
89. See Scott Allen, In Fat War Doctors Have Few Options, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 1,
2004, at Al (reporting that, according to some critics, FDA reviewers "subject weight-loss
drugs to tougher safety standards than other drugs because they do not regard obesity as a true
disease"); Laura Johannes & Steve Stecklow, Dire Warnings About Obesity Rely on Slippery
Statistic, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 1998, at B 1 ("[T]he FDA's bar for approving new drugs is lower
for disease treatments than for other problems, such as baldness or skin wrinkles. The agency
is less likely to approve a drug for a nondisease condition when it is shown to have serious
side effects-such as those that diet drugs produce."); see also Christopher Rowland, FDA
Chief Looks to Speed Diabetes, Obesity Drugs, BosToN GLOBE, June 4, 2003, at At; Rob
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these two extremes lie difficult and increasingly contested judgments
about the nature of the condition intended for treatment,' as illustrated
by recent debates over the use of psychotropic drugs,9' stimulants in
children with behavioral disorders, 92 the abortifacient drug Mifeprex ®
(mifepristone), 93 and the vaccine Gardasil® (designed to prevent a sexu-
Stein, Is Obesity a Disease?; Insurance, Drug Access May Hinge on Answer, WASH. POST,
Nov. 10, 2003, atAl.
90. See Lars Noah, Pigeonholing Illness: Medical Diagnosis as a Legal Construct, 50
HASTINGS L.J. 241, 259-63, 290-92 (1999). Commentators have criticized the drug industry
for encouraging the medicalization of normal or relatively minor conditions. See Ray Moyni-
han et al., Selling Sickness: The Pharmaceutical Industry and Disease Mongering, 324 BRIT.
MED. J. 886 (2002); Rob Stein, Marketing the Illness and the Cure? Drug Ads May Sell Peo-
ple on the Idea That They Are Sick, WASH. POST, May 30, 2006, at A3; Fiona Walsh, Glaxo
Denies Pushing "Lifestyle" Treatments: "Restless Leg Syndrome Can Ruin People's Lives":
British Drug Firms' Figures Outstrip Expectations, GUARDIAN (LONDON), Apr. 28, 2006, at 28
(GSK "defended itself against accusations that it is turning healthy people into patients by
'disease mongering' and pushing 'lifestyle' treatments for little-known ailments [e.g., restless
leg syndrome]. Studies published in a respected medical journal ... accused the big pharma-
ceutical companies of 'medicalising' problems such as high cholesterol and sexual
dysfunction."); see also Marc Kaufman, Hormone Replacement Gets New Scrutiny; Finding of
Increased Risks Prompts Federal Effort, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2002, at Al (reporting that
"federal officials want to explore whether hormone therapies and their producers have encour-
aged women to believe menopause is a condition to be treated, rather than an inevitable and
natural set of changes to be managed:' noting "the FDA's discomfort with the way that hor-
mone treatments have been widely presented as an antidote to menopause").
91. See Colleen Cebuliak, Life as a Blonde: The Use of Prozac in the '90s, 33 ALTA. L.
REv. 611 (1995) (discussing emotional enhancement and cosmetic pharmacology); Jeff Donn,
Are We Taking Too Many Drugs?, NEWSDAY, Apr. 19, 2005, at B13 ("[Tihe Centers for Dis-
ease Control voiced concern about huge off-label growth of antidepressants to treat such
loosely defined syndromes as compulsion, panic or anxiety and PMS. Drug makers, doctors
and patients have all been quick to medicate some conditions once accepted simply as part of
the human condition."); Shankar Vedantam, Drug Ads Hyping Anxiety Make Some Uneasy,
WASH. POST, July 16, 2001, at Al (describing the successful marketing of Paxil (paroxetine),
and noting that "pharmaceutical companies, traditionally in the business of finding new drugs
for existing disorders, are increasingly in the business of seeking new disorders for existing
drugs"); see also Lars Noah, Comfortably Numb: Medicalizing (and Mitigating) Pain-and-
Suffering Damages, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 431 (2009).
92. See Gardiner Harris, ED.A. Strengthens Warnings on Stimulants' Risks, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 22, 2006, at A14; Shankar Vedantam, Debate over Drugs for ADHD Reignites:
Long-Term Benefit for Children at Issue, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2009, at Al (reporting that
prescriptions have reached almost 40 million annually); see also Gardiner Harris, Use of An-
tipsychotics in Children Is Criticized, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2008, at A20.
93. See Lars Noah, A Miscarriage in the Drug Approval Process?: Mifepristone Em-
broils the FDA in Abortion Politics, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 571, 593 (2001) ("Some
opponents have suggested that the agency might ... recast mifepristone's intended use in
terminating pregnancy as a risk to the fetus rather than (or perhaps in addition to) a benefit to
the mother, which might then justify summary withdrawal of the drug as an imminent hazard
to public health."); see also id. at 580 ("[Tlhe clinical utility of a drug that can terminate preg-
nancy must lie in the fact that it provides a safer (or more convenient) alternative to a surgical
abortion."); id. at 581-82 (questioning the product's eligibility for accelerated approval as a
treatment for "serious illness").
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ally transmitted disease, human papillomavirus (HPV), linked to cervical
cancer).
94
Some commentators would hold manufacturers of "lifestyle" drugs
to a higher standard. One laundry list of such products included treat-
ments for erectile dysfunction (ED), arthritis, obesity, and urinary
incontinence," but it failed to explain the reasons for lumping these dis-
parate drugs together: was it that they offered primarily symptomatic
relief (or targeted a mere risk factor 96) and required chronic use? Aside
from problems of recreational abuse, are powerful analgesics "lifestyle"
drugs? Contraceptive products sometimes get trivialized in precisely this
fashion.9'
Even if not elevated to the vaunted status of a genuine "disease,"
bothersome conditions (e.g., irritable bowel syndrome) and disfiguring
ailments (e.g., cystic acne) undoubtedly have adverse effects on the suf-
ferers' quality of life, which can take an emotional and financial toll on
94. See Charlotte J. Haug, Editorial, Human Papillomavirus Vaccination: Reasons for
Caution, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 861 (2008); Sylvia Law, Human Papillomavirus Vaccination,
Private Choice, and Public Health, 41 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1731, 1733-42, 1755-64 (2008);
see also Note, Toward a Twenty-First Century Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 121 HARV. L. REV.
1820, 1838-41 (2008) (suggesting, for purposes of evaluating the constitutionality of compul-
sory immunization programs, a distinction between "medically necessary" vaccines, which
offer the only real means of protection against infectious diseases, and "practically necessary"
vaccines that protect, for instance, against STDs (e.g., HPV and hepatitis B), which could be
avoided through other means).
95. See Joseph Weber & Amy Barrett, The New Era of Lifestyle Drugs, Bus. WK., May
11, 1998, at 92; see also David Gilbert et al., Lifestyle Medicines, 321 BRIT. MED. J. 1341,
1342 (2000) (offering a similar list, and focusing on payment issues); Cindy P. Thomas,
Incentive-Based Formularies, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2186, 2188 (2003) ("Some insurers
have created a fourth, 'lifestyle,' tier for more discretionary or 'cosmetic' drugs... ").
96. What once qualified as a mere risk factor may, over time, get recharacterized as a
disease in its own right, as in the case of hypertension. See, e.g., Denise Grady, As Silent Killer
Returns, Doctors Rethink Tactics to Lower Blood Pressure, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1998, at Fl
(reporting that "it is not known whether all drugs that lower blood pressure also protect
against heart attack and stroke"). Thereupon, physicians began diagnosing patients with pre-
hypertension. See Elizabeth Agnvall, Making Us (Nearly) Sick: A Majority of Americans Are
Now Considered to Have at Least One "Pre-Disease" or "Borderline" Condition. Is This Any
Way to Treat Us?, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 2004, at Fl; see also January W. Payne, Forever
Pregnant; Guidelines: Treat Nearly All Women as Pre-Pregnant, WASH. POST, May 16, 2006,
at Fl.
97. See, e.g., Hill v. Searle Lab., 884 F.2d 1064, 1069-70 & n.9 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding
that 1UDs do not serve an "exceptional social need" in part because many alternative forms of
contraception exist, including abstention); see also MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475
N.E.2d 65, 69-70 (Mass. 1985) (emphasizing the elective nature of contraceptives). But see
Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293, 1305-06 (D. Minn. 1988) (disagreeing).
Contraceptives may, however, have unmistakable medical justifications, see Steven R. Bayer
& Alan H. DeCherney, Clinical Manifestations and Treatment of Dysfunctional Uterine Bleed-
ing, 269 JAMA 1823, 1826-28 (1993), including for women in whom pregnancy would
present dangers to themselves or their children (indeed, the labeling for prescription drugs that
treat other conditions may insist that patients use contraceptives in order to guard against the
risk of birth defects).
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them.98 If not unduly dangerous, the FDA does permit marketing of pre-
scription products that presumably everyone would label as "lifestyle"
drugs (e.g., wrinkle reducers), 99 though even unmistakably cosmetic
products such as Botox® may have secondary therapeutic uses.' °° In the
final analysis, all drugs are, to one degree or another, lifestyle drugs.''
IV. SERIOUS PRODUCT STEWARDSHIP
Genuine product stewardship, at least if understood as an effort to
make the most of a scarce resource, strikes me as far more defensible
98. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Drug Designs Are Different, 11l
YALE L.J. 151, 176-77 (2001) (noting that "there exists a class of patients who benefit emo-
tionally and psychologically," even if not physically, from such products, and recognizing that
"prescription drugs and devices [with] aesthetic properties can have profoundly beneficial
effects on an individual's psychic well-being"); Denise Grady, FDA Pulls a Drug, and Patients
Despair, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2001, at FI (reporting that those who favored withdrawing
Lotronex® (alosetron), a drug indicated for use in patients with irritable bowel syndrome, had
argued that its risks of severe constipation or ischemic colitis were unacceptable because it
only treated a non-life-threatening condition, while the majority of patients on the drug who
had suffered no serious side effects protested the withdrawal because the drug had helped
them to cope with a condition that significantly interfered with their daily life activities).
99. See Natasha Singer, Skin Deep; Injecting Silicone, and Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26,
2006, at G 1.
100. See Lisa Girion, Concern Raised on Botox Safety: The FDA Is Reviewing
Botulinum-Based Drugs Used to Treat Cerebral Palsy and Other Ills, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 9,
2008, at Cl; Rhonda L. Rundle, Botox Use on Migraines Gains Support, WALL ST. J., Sept.
12, 2008, at B3; Shankar Vedantam, Botox Appears to Ease Depression Symptoms, WASH.
POST, May 21, 2006, at A9; see also Liz Kowalczyk, Doctors Seek a Viagra Variant for Lung
Ailment, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 3, 2001, at Al (reporting that physicians have used sildenafil to
treat pulmonary hypertension in infants); Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Cosmetic Saves a Cure for
Sleeping Sickness, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 9, 2001, at Al.
101. Cf Anita Bernstein & Joseph Bernstein, An Information Prescription for Drug
Regulation, 54 Buo. L. REV. 569, 608-11 (2006) (conceding that "lifestyle" drugs lie along a
continuum, though suggesting a distinction based on the exercise of patient choice). A simi-
larly vague dividing line exists with regard to medical procedures, treating "elective" surgeries
as non-essential (or, at least, non-emergency). See General and Plastic Surgery Devices; Effec-
tive Date of Requirement for Premarket Approval of Silicone Inflatable Breast Prosthesis, 58
Fed. Reg. 3436, 3439 (proposed Jan. 8, 1993) ("Whether performed for reconstruction or
augmentation purposes, breast implantation is a discretionary elective surgical procedure per-
formed for its psychological benefits."); see also Zalazar v. Vercimak, 633 N.E.2d 1223,
1225-27 (I11. App. Ct. 1993) (adopting a subjective standard of decision causation for in-
formed consent claims involving elective cosmetic surgery); Schuck, supra note 40, at 955
(proposing a heightened consent duty in the case of elective treatments); cf Whitlock v. Duke
Univ., 637 F Supp. 1463, 1470-71 (M.D.N.C. 1986) (concluding that the degree of required
risk disclosure is higher in the context of non-therapeutic research), aff'd, 829 F.2d 1340, 1343
(4th Cir. 1987). But see Pauscher v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 408 N.W.2d 355, 359-61 (Iowa
1987) (declining to draw any such distinction). Even so, unmistakably lifesaving procedures
technically also should qualify as elective insofar as respect for autonomy means that patients
have a right to decline treatment. See Dan W. Brock & Steven A. Wartman, When Competent
Patients Make Irrational Choices, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1595 (1990).
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than the previously discussed "stewardship" proposals.' Labeling de-
signed to assist physicians-in making sure that the right drugs get to the
right patients-offers the first line of defense. Unfortunately, research
indicates that package inserts often fail to ensure rational prescribing.' 3
These issues go beyond labeling to include choices about how and to
whom a seller markets a drug. Such a theory might morph into a design
defect claim, viewing the drug product as a package or bundle that in-
cludes choices about how patients may secure access to it.
'04
Just as regulatory officials have become more creative in adopting
risk management plans,' 5 tort litigation might encourage manufacturers
102. See, e.g., Laura Landro, The Informed Patient: Curbing Antibiotic Use in War on
"Superbugs", WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2008, at DI (reporting that hospitals have begun to adopt,
sometimes under pressure from public and private insurers, "antimicrobial stewardship pro-
grams," which involve teams of specialists monitoring antibiotic use to reduce the spread of
resistant bacterial strains by, for example, urging physicians to resist the tendency to prescribe
powerful antibiotics in favor of selecting the narrowest-spectrum drug available for treatment
of a particular patient's infection); see also Labeling Requirements for Systemic Antibacterial
Drug Products Intended for Human Use, 68 Fed. Reg. 6062 (Feb. 6, 2003); Noah, supra note
41, at 437 ("[T]he FDA recently proposed mandating a best practices statement in the labeling
of antibiotics, reminding physicians against overprescribing because of the public health con-
sequences associated with growing drug-resistance."). In order to maximize the useful life of a
new antibiotic, could the FDA approve it only for use by infectious disease specialists in hos-
pitals (trusting them to save the drug for vancomycin-resistant pathogens), or might the
agency persuade the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to place the drug in Schedule
II? See Scott B. Markow, Note, Penetrating the Walls of Drug-Resistant Bacteria: A Statutory
Prescription to Combat Antibiotic Misuse, 87 GEO. L.J. 531, 542-43 (1998) (doubting the
legality of either one of these approaches); see also Kevin Outterson, The Vanishing Public
Domain: Antibiotic Resistance, Pharmaceutical Innovation and Intellectual Propery Law,
67 U. PITT. L. REV. 67, 67-68, 73-86, 94-114 (2005) (elaborating on problems of resistance
to antibiotics and antivirals, and discussing various proposed solutions).
103. See Karen E. Lasser et al., Adherence to Black Box Warnings for Prescription
Medications in Outpatients, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 338 (2006); Noah, supra note 41,
at 438-42; Andrea Petersen, How Drug Alerts Trickle Down to Your Doctor: Amid Flurry of
Red Flags About Serious Side Effects, Prescribing Turns Trickier, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2004,
at D4 ("[R]esearch underscores how difficult it is for doctors to stay on top of the mass of
drug information, and decide how or whether to act. The number of drugs has exploded in
recent years, so there are simply more side effects and potential drug-to-drug interactions to
keep track of."); Jonathan D. Rockoff, Doctors Buried by Drug Data, BALT. SUN, Apr. 7,
2006, at ID.
104. See, e.g., Carl Salzman, Mandatory Monitoring for Side Effects: The "Bundling" of
Clozapine, 323 NEW ENG. J. MED. 827 (1990) (describing a controversial (and short-lived)
system of restricted distribution adopted by the manufacturer of the new antipsychotic Clo-
zaril" (partly in response to liability fears) that included weekly blood testing as a prerequisite
for dispensing the drug to schizophrenic patients in order to guard against fatalities caused by
agranulocytosis, a side effect reported during clinical trials in less than two percent of sub-
jects); see also Noah, supra note 85, at 1214 (discussing other contexts that involve product
bundling).
105. See Lars Noah, Ambivalent Commitments to Federalism in Controlling the Practice
of Medicine, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 149, 188-91 (2004) (discussing a variety of distribution
restrictions on prescription drugs considered by regulatory officials); Gardiner Harris, ED.A.
Imposes Tougher Rules for Acne Drug, N.Y TIMES, Aug. 13, 2005, at Al ("Health officials say
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to craft such programs." For instance, with teratogens such as thalido-
mide and isotretinoin, plaintiffs might pursue negligent marketing claims
on the theory that a prescription drug manufacturer should have further
restricted distribution.'O' Such claims would represent a hybrid between
more traditional defects in design and labeling,0 8 challenging a manufac-
the new plan is the latest sign the FD.A. is losing faith that the nation's doctors and pharma-
cists can adequately safeguard the health of patients .... [T]ime after time over the last
decade, medical professionals have ignored the advice [in labeling], providing drugs to pa-
tients at risk of severe complications."); id. ("[Ijnstead [of withdrawing effective drugs], the
agency has begun fashioning restricted distribution programs ... to ensure that health profes-
sionals follow its guidelines."). Congress recently granted the FDA express authority to restrict
distribution of prescription drugs to specially trained physicians. See FDAAA, Pub. L. No.
110-85, § 901(b), 121 Stat. 823, 930 (2007) (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(3)(A)).
106. See Margaret Gilhooley, When Drugs Are Safe for Some but Not Others: The FDA
Experience and Alternatives for Products Liability, 36 Hous. L. REV. 927, 945-47 (1999); id.
at 946 ("The best case for applying a distribution limit, if products liability law were to be
extended to recognize a new type of defect, relates to misuse of a drug that poses grave risks
not only to the immediate users, but also to the wider public."). With little explanation, how-
ever, this commentator dismissed the possibility:
Limiting the distribution of drugs, however, is too novel to be an appropriate basis
for a finding of products liability. It is not clear, for example, how such a responsi-
bility fits into the structure of the Restatement. A limit on distribution goes beyond
being a warning, but unlike the typical design defect, it does not relate to a change
in the formulation or dose of the drug.
Id. at 945; see also id. at 946-49 (favoring, instead, patient-directed labeling to serve as a
counterweight to inappropriate prescribing by physicians).
107. See Lars Noah, Too High a Price for Some Drugs?: The FDA Burdens Reproductive
Choice, 44 SAN DIECo L. REV. 231, 236-37 & n.23, 256 & n.100 (2007) (noting that the
manufacturer of Accutane has faced claims that it should have taken steps beyond the issuance
of stem warnings to both doctors and patients to ensure that women would not become preg-
nant while using this teratogenic drug, and adding that these lawsuits have failed on other
grounds); cf. id. at 239 (wondering whether the FDA could "demand that the manufacturer sell
a bundled product (for example, a single pill that combined a teratogen with a hormonal con-
traceptive)").
108. Some negligent marketing claims relate primarily to issues of product design, while
others focus on the nature of the information communicated to users (i.e., advertising), but a
third subset of negligent marketing claims-those that relate to distribution choices--do not
fit as neatly into an existing liability box. See Richard C. Ausness, Tort Liability for the Sale of
Non-Defective Products: An Analysis and Critique of the Concept of Negligent Marketing, 53
S.C. L. REV. 907, 909-10, 915-16, 944-46 (2002); see also id. at 939 ("Just a few years ago,
it appeared that negligent marketing was about to become a powerful tool in products liability
litigation, particularly where the products involved were not 'defective' in the traditional
sense."); id. at 954 ("[A] manufacturer's failure to actively monitor retail sales or to supervise
the conduct of distributors or retail sellers seems more like nonfeasance than misfeasance.");
id. at 965 (concluding for a variety of reasons that courts should decline to recognize such
claims). Although many of the broader critiques of this theory have force, the distinctive
treatment of medical technologies for purposes of applying other liability rules may justify
some willingness to entertain negligent marketing claims. Ausness also mentions prescription
drug products, though focusing primarily on OxyContin. See id. at 915-17, 945 & n.349; see
also id. at 916 (making a passing reference to the diet drug combination fen-phen). Like the
handgun litigation, OxyContin relates more to criminal misuse, see infra note 119, while fen-
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turer's choice about the appropriate channels for distributing potentially
hazardous goods,'°9 in a way that resembles novel (and largely unsuc-
cessful) theories asserted against gun sellers."
Although the Products Liability Restatement finds a bright line dis-
tinguishing prescription and nonprescription products, which it then uses
to justify different rules for the former category (because of the power of
differential marketing),"' pharmaceuticals actually lie along a contin-
uum. For instance, stricter prescription requirements apply to controlled
substances and certain teratogens (and the most restrictive access restric-
tions apply to investigational drugs supplied to subjects enrolled in a
clinical trial). Although most people use prescription drugs on an out-
patient basis, physicians order the administration of some medications in
hospitals and other controlled settings."2 A few over-the-counter (OTC)
drug products now require securing permission from a pharmacist,' and
phen, which relates to problems of inappropriate off-label prescribing, better matches the type
of negligent marketing claim that strikes me as worth considering.
109. See, e.g., Moning v. Alfono, 254 N.W.2d 759 (Mich. 1977) (holding that a jury
should resolve negligence claims against the manufacturer, wholesaler and retailer of sling-
shots marketed directly to children); id. at 771 ("The issue in the instant case is not whether
slingshots should be manufactured, but the narrower question of whether marketing slingshots
directly to children creates an unreasonable risk of harm."); cf. First Nat'l Bank of Dwight v.
Regent Sports Corp., 803 F.2d 1431 (7th Cir. 1986) (rejecting failure-to-wam and negligent
marketing claims against the manufacturer of metal-tipped lawn darts sold as appropriate for
adults only, but allowing claims for violations of federal regulations prohibiting sales of such
products through toy stores and similar retail outlets).
110. See, e.g., Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001); Chicago v. Beretta
U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099 (Ill. 2004); Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d
1055 (N.Y. 2001); see also Jean Macchiaroli Eggen & John G. Culhane, Gun Torts: Defining a
Cause of Action for Victims in Suits Against Gun Manufacturers, 81 N.C. L. REV. 115, 204-09
(2002). But see Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1201-09 (9th Cir. 2003) (allowing a negli-
gent marketing claim to proceed); City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136
(Ohio 2002) (allowing a municipality to pursue such claims). Some of these lawsuits alleged
that manufacturers of certain types of weapons or ammunition should not have sold these
products to civilians, instead limiting their distribution to law-enforcement professionals and
the military. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 152, 156-57 (2d Cir. 1997) (not-
ing, in the course of rejecting such a claim, that the manufacturer of Black Talon" bullets
subsequently limited sales to professionals); id. at 163 (Calabresi, J., dissenting) ("Selling
tanks to the armed forces is fine; selling them to the general public is, I would think, clearly
negligent.").
111. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 98, at 156, 170-73, 178-79; id. at 169
("[Sluch differentiation [in design defect standards based on users] is not possible for nonpre-
scription products, which are available to everyone on the open market.").
112. See, e.g., Press Release, FDA Approves Entereg to Help Restore Bowel Function
Following Surgery (May 20, 2008), available at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2008/
NEW01838.html (explaining that, in order to minimize risks relative to benefits, this drug will
be restricted to inpatient use, only at specially certified hospitals, and patients may receive no
more than 15 doses).
113. See Daniel Healey, Plan BTC: The Case for a Third Class of Drugs in the United
States, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 375, 375-77, 385-86 (2008) (explaining that the FDA condi-
tioned approval for switches from prescription status of emergency contraceptive and smoking
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plaintiffs might argue that other nonprescription drugs also should move
"behind the counter" (or even to Rx status)."4 In some instances, physi-
cians may even "prescribe" OTC products."'
Conversely, the relatively recent phenomenon of advertising pre-
scription drugs directly to consumers, as well as the advent of Internet
prescribing and dispensing, may have made these products more similar
to OTC drugs."6 Some commentators have suggested that drug manufac-
turers have a duty to cut off supplies to Internet companies that engage
cessation products on an age restriction enforced by pharmacists); see also Notice of Public
Meeting, Behind the Counter Availability of Certain Drugs, 72 Fed. Reg. 56,769 (Oct. 4,
2007) (seeking input about the merits of this approach). Federal law now requires behind-the-
counter status (though not limited to pharmacies) for products containing pseudoephedrine,
though this statute sought to prevent criminal diversion rather than any direct risks to the con-
sumer. See 21 U.S.C.A § 830(e) (2008); Jean C. O'Connor et al., Developing Lasting Legal
Solutions to the Dual Problems of Methamphetamine Production and Use, 82 N.D. L. REV.
1165, 1178-79 (2006).
114. See Lars Noah, Treat Yourself: Is Self-Medication the Prescription for What Ails
American Health Care?, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 359, 382-83 (2006); id. at 381 ("If an OTC
drug with otherwise unassailable labeling and design causes an injury, then the victim might
argue that the product should have been made available only under professional medical su-
pervision and never sold directly to consumers."); see also Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings,
Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1193, 1271 (1994) ("Why should
the presence of a good warning, no matter how explicit, prevent courts from considering the
value of alternative marketing strategies in light of the common tendency of people to overuse
over-the-counter drugs that provide relief from chronic ailments?").
115. See, e.g., Ferrara v. Berlex Lab., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 552, 553-55 & n.1 (E.D. Pa.
1990) (applying the learned intermediary doctrine to reject claims for failing to warn of dan-
gerous interaction against the manufacturers of a prescription antidepressant and an OTC
decongestant prescribed by the plaintiff's physician); see also Kelley v. Wiggins, 724 S.W.2d
443, 449-50 (Ark. 1987) (affirming verdict against a clinic for negligently using Sudafed® in a
high-risk patient); Sharkey v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 600 So. 2d 701, 711 (La. Ct. App. 1992)
(crediting physician's testimony that he would not have recommended aspirin for child with
flu-like symptoms if the OTC label had included a fuller warning of the risk of Reye's syn-
drome); Noah, supra note 62, at 321 & n. 117, 338 (noting that the FDA sometimes approves
separate professional labeling for OTC drugs); Peter Temin, Realized Benefits from Switching
Drugs, 35 J.L. & ECON. 351, 358-59 (1992); Daniel W. Whitney, Product Liability Issues for
the Expanding OTC Drug Category, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 321, 329-30 (1993) (arguing that
the learned intermediary rule should apply in such cases). But see Mitchell v. VLI Corp., 786
F. Supp. 966, 970 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (declining to apply the learned intermediary rule to an
OTC contraceptive sponge that a physician had supplied to his patient).
116. See Chester Chuang, Note, Is There a Doctor in the House? Using Failure-to-Warn
Liability to Enhance the Safety of Online Prescribing, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1452, 1483 & n.131
(2000) (imagining the emergence of a new class of "quasi-prescription" drugs, and suggesting
that prescription antihistamines might qualify); id. at 1453 ("In an online world where the
physician is conspicuously absent, or at best virtual, the learned intermediary doctrine breaks
down .... ); see also Henderson & Twerski, supra note 98, at 173 n.91 (conceding that, if
physicians routinely acquiesced in patient demands for heavily advertised products, "[tihis
breakdown of the learned intermediary as a screening device would make marketing of pre-
scription drugs not substantially different from that of nonprescription products").
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in irresponsible online prescribing and dispensing." 7 Serious practical
difficulties would, however, complicate any such effort."8 More contro-
versially, if general practitioners engaged in patterns of dangerous
overprescribing, then a plaintiff might claim that the drug manufacturer
had a duty to limit access to only some subset of responsible physicians
(perhaps only specialists or physicians who have registered with the
manufacturer after attesting to their knowledge of the risks involved in
the use of a product)."9
More than twenty years ago, in Swayze v. McNeil Laboratories,
Inc.,12 a federal court rejected such a claim. In that case, a child had suf-
fered respiratory depression (and eventually died) after a certified
registered nurse anesthetist (CRNA) administered an excessive dose of
117. See Richard C. Ausness, Will More Aggressive Marketing Practices Lead to Greater
Tort Liability for Prescription Drug Manufacturers?, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 97, 136 (2002)
(forecasting that negligent marketing claims will be brought against manufacturers of pre-
scription drugs when patients suffer injuries as a result of dispensing by unscrupulous Internet
pharmacies); Chuang, supra note 116, at 1480-88; cf Stephanie Feldman Aleong, Green
Medicine: Using Lessons from Tort Law and Environmental Law to Hold Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers and Authorized Distributors Liable for Injuries Caused by Counterfeit Drugs,
69 U. PrrT. L. REV. 245, 265-72 (2007) (suggesting an entirely inapt nondelegable duty the-
ory to hold manufacturers liable for hazardous counterfeiting).
118. See Chuang, supra note 116, at 1460-61 (noting that Pfizer had sought assistance
from the Federal Trade Commission to combat online prescribing of Viagra); cf Ceci Con-
nolly, Pfizer Cuts Supplies to Canadian Drugstores; Sales Are Halted to Reimporters of
Bargain Drugs, WASH. PosT, Feb. 19,2004, at AlO. The FDA once conditioned drug approval
on restricted distribution through a single pharmacy. See Aaron Zitner, Date-Rape Drug OK'd
to Treat Sleep Disorder, L.A. TIMES, July 18, 2002, at A12 (GHB); cf. Anna Wilde Mathews &
Leila Abboud, FDA Approves Generic OxyContin-Teva, Endo Get Clearance After Agreeing
to Implement Abuse-Reduction Programs, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 2004, at A3 ("[Tihe FDA has
never limited any opioid to certain pharmacies, and agency officials say they don't have the
authority to block certain physicians from prescribing a drug.").
119. See Erik Eckholm & Olga Pierce, Methadone Rises as a Painkiller with Big Risks,
N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 17, 2008, at Al ("Methadone, once used mainly in addiction treatment cen-
ters to replace heroin, is today being given out by family doctors, osteopaths and nurse
practitioners for throbbing backs ... and a host of other severe pains .... [The FDA] is now
considering requiring doctors to take special classes on prescribing narcotics."); cf In re TMJ
Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 97 F3d 1050, 1060 (8th Cir. 1996) (Heaney, J., dissenting) (sug-
gesting that the manufacturer of Teflon should have ceased supplying this raw material to a
medical device company because it knew of dangers associated with this application); Hun-
nings v. Texaco, Inc., 29 F.3d 1480, 1485-86 (1 1th Cir. 1994) (holding that a negligence claim
could proceed against the supplier of mineral spirits where it knew that a retailer packaged the
chemical in used milk jugs and sold the product without warnings); Mason v. Texaco Inc., 862
F.2d 242, 246 (10th Cir. 1988) (explaining that a "bulk seller [has] the obligation to sell only
to knowledgeable and responsible distributors"). Courts generally have rejected negligent
marketing claims involving the opioid analgesic OxyContin. See, e.g., Labzda v. Purdue
Pharma L.P., 292 F Supp. 2d 1346, 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2003); see also Phillip J. Wininger, Note,
Pharmaceutical Overpromotion Liability: The Legal Battle over Rural Prescription Drug
Abuse, 93 Ky. L.J. 269, 281-94 (2004-2005) (evaluating the prospects for such claims).
120. 807 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1987).
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Sublimaze® (fentanyl) during surgery."' The nurse had, without any su-
pervision by an anesthesiologist, selected this powerful narcotic agent
from among various alternatives, administered an inappropriately high
dose, monitored the patient's response, and decided how to counteract
the drug's effects at the conclusion of the surgery. Although a clear vio-
lation of state law governing prescribing privileges, CRNAs routinely
made these sorts of choices because of a shortage of licensed anesthesi-
ologists.'2 2 The plaintiff had argued, among other things, that the
manufacturer-knowing of this widespread practice of irresponsible
use-should have restricted sales of the drug "to hospitals which estab-
lish and enforce appropriate procedures to assure that Sublimaze is
prescribed and administered in compliance with state law."'23 The federal
district court granted a directed verdict to the defendant, and a divided
court of appeals affirmed.' The dissenting judge, however, thought that
"McNeil could have prevented liability by removing, selectively, the
drug from hospitals that could not ensure that qualified doctors would
prescribe.', 25
Perhaps recognition of such claims would represent a form of prod-
uct stewardship that courts resolving tort litigation should embrace.
More so than proposed new obligations to engage in potentially endless
testing or to communicate essentially meaningless disclaimers, a duty to
121. See id. at 466.
122. See id. at 466-67; id. at 472-73 (Goldberg, J., dissenting); id. at 476 ("[Ihe testi-
mony established a generalized pattern and commonly known practice in many hospitals that
surgeons, the only doctors present, routinely did not supervise anesthesia.").
123. Id. at 469 n.5 (conceding that "a drug manufacturer could" have done so, but adding
that "liability is imposed only for a defendant's failure to act reasonably, not for failing to do
all that could be done"). The plaintiff also had argued that the manufacturer should have
warned patients directly or completely withdrawn the drug from the market.
124. See id. at 466; id. at 471 ("[I]t is the physicians who have undertaken the responsi-
bility of supervising CRNAs, and that responsibility cannot be shunted onto, or shared with,
drug manufacturers."); id. at 472 ("The defendant cannot control the individual practices of
the medical community, even if it is the prevailing practice, and we decline to impose such a
duty."). The court noted at the outset that the plaintiff's separate medical malpractice claims
had resulted in a "substantial" settlement. See id. at 465.
125. See id. at 477 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). As he elaborated:
McNeil would not have had to police the operating room by engaging in selective
withdrawal or by conducting other activities suggested by the plaintiff. Enforcing
compliance would have remained the task of the hospitals, doctors, and Mississippi
authorities. McNeil's only task would have been to obtain adequate assurances of
compliance on which it could reasonably rely.
Id. (adding that "pressures resulting from selective withdrawal would likely have forced hospi-
tals themselves to abandon the illegal practice and to insist that anesthesiologists were hired or
that surgeons were required meaningfully to supervise anesthesia"); see also id. at 474 (argu-
ing that the defendant had a duty "to monitor and ensure that the products it manufactures and
markets are not generally used in an unreasonably dangerous fashion").
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consider the adoption of distribution restrictions would better promote
risk minimization. Obviously, some negligent marketing claims might
create tension with emerging FDA policies in this area (though conflicts
seem far less likely to arise than in the area of labeling), and they also
could adversely impact patient access, but this potential extension of
drug products liability strikes me as more worthy of exploration than the
other approaches that have attracted attention in recent years.
